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1 I.

OVERVIEW

2

1.

3 violations

This class action complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief for privacy
by

Facebook

on

the

websites

Cancer.org,

Cancer.net,

Melanoma.org,

4 ShawneeMission.org, BarnesJewish.org, ClevelandClinic.org, MDAnderson.org, and other health
5 care and hospital websites (hereafter, the “health care Defendants”).
6

2.

Plaintiffs’ cancer and other sensitive health-related Internet communications with

7 these medical websites were divulged to Facebook and acquired by Facebook along with the
8 Plaintiffs’ personally-identifiable information. In addition, Facebook acquired, tracked, and used
9 the Plaintiffs’ sensitive medical information collected through medical websites and the Facebook
10 website for purposes of direct marketing.
11

3.

The disclosures, tracking, and use of their sensitive medical information for direct

12 marketing were all done without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent in violation of their privacy
13 rights under federal and state law.
14

4.

Defendant Facebook failed to disclose to its users that it (a) tracks, intercepts, and

15 acquires user communications in violation of other websites’ privacy policies, (b) tracks,
16 intercepts, and acquires user communications with medical websites, including the websites of
17 medical providers subject to HIPAA and other medical privacy laws, and (c) uses the personal
18 information it gathers from its users, including sensitive medical information, to place its users
19 into medical categories for purposes of direct marketing.
20

5.

The health care Defendants’ actions in divulging sensitive personally-identifiable

21 medical information about the Plaintiffs to Facebook without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent
22 violated the Privacy Policies at each website at issue in this case. However, Plaintiffs are without
23 knowledge as to whether the disclosures by the health care Defendants were willful and knowing
24 because Facebook does not publicly disclose the full extent of its tracking to either its users or
25 website developers.
26
27
28
1
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1 II.

PARTIES

2

6.

Plaintiff Winston Smith is a resident of Missouri and a registered Facebook user.1

3

7.

Plaintiff Jane Doe is a resident of Kansas and a registered Facebook user.

4

8.

Plaintiff Jane Doe II is a resident of Missouri and registered Facebook user.

5

9.

Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) is a publicly traded Delaware corporation

6 headquartered at 156 University Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94301. Facebook does business
7 throughout the United States and the world, deriving substantial revenue from interstate
8 commerce.
9

10.

Defendant American Cancer Society, Inc. (“ACS”) is a not-for profit corporation

10 headquartered at 250 Williams Street, NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. ACS does business
11 throughout the United States, deriving substantial revenue from interstate commerce.
12

11.

Defendant American Society of Clinical Oncology, Inc. (“ASCO”) is a not-for-

13 profit corporation headquartered at 2318 Mill Road, No. 800, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. ASCO
14 does business throughout the United States, deriving substantial revenue from interstate
15 commerce.
16

12.

Defendant Melanoma Research Foundation (“MRF”) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit

17 organization headquartered at 1411 K Street NW, Ste. 800, Washington, D.C. 20005. MRF does
18 business throughout the United States, deriving substantial revenue from interstate commerce.
19

13.

Defendant Adventist Health System (“Adventist”) is a non-profit health care

20 system operating 44 hospitals across the United States headquartered at 900 Hope Way,
21 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714. Adventist does business throughout the United States, deriving
22 substantial revenues from interstate commerce.
23

14.

Defendant BJC Healthcare (“BJC”) is a non-profit health care provider based in St.

24 Louis, Missouri headquartered at One Barnes-Jewish Hospital Plaza, St. Louis, Missouri 63110.
25 BJC does business throughout the United States, deriving substantial revenue from interstate
26
1

This Complaint reveals personal medical information about the Plaintiffs which were wrongfully
intercepted, disclosed, and shared amongst the Defendants. Plaintiffs file this Complaint listed
28 anonymously to protect their medical information from further disclosure.
27

2
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1 commerce.
2

15.

Defendant Cleveland Clinic (“Cleveland Clinic”) is a non-profit health care

3 provider headquartered at 9500 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44195. Cleveland Clinic does
4 business throughout the United States, deriving substantial revenue from interstate commerce.
5

16.

Defendant University of Texas – MD Anderson Cancer Center (“MD Anderson”) is

6 a non-profit health care provider headquartered at 1515 Holcombe Boulevard, Houston, Texas
7 77030. MD Anderson does business throughout the United States, deriving substantial revenue
8 from interstate commerce.
9 III.
10

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
17.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because each has

11 sufficient minimum contacts with this district in that they operate and market their websites
12 throughout the country and in this district. Additionally, Defendant Facebook is headquartered in
13 this district.
14

18.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 because this

15 action arises under 18 U.S.C. §2510, et. seq., (the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). This
16 Court further has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(d) (the Class Action
17 Fairness Act) because the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and
18 costs, and a member of the class is a citizen of a State different from any Defendant.
19

19.

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims

20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367 because the state law claims form part of the same case or
21 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
22

20.

Venue is proper in this district because a substantial part of the events or omissions

23 giving rise to the claim occurred in this judicial district and because Facebook’s Terms of Use
24 governing its relationship with its users and developers adopt California law and choose California
25 as the venue for disputes.
26 IV.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

27

A.

How the Internet Works

28

21.

Internet

users

employ

web-browsers
3

to

send

and

receive

electronic
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1 communications.
2

22.

Web-browsers are software applications that allow consumers to send, receive, and

3 view electronic communications on the Internet. Web browsers include a Terms of Use or Service,
4 which prohibit users from engaging in unlawful or unauthorized tracking of the communications
5 of others or from using the service to engage in criminal or otherwise unlawful acts. For example,
6 major web-browsers such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Apple Safari all
7 expressly prohibit unlawful acts, and Plaintiffs are not aware of any major web-browser which
8 consents to the use of its service for criminal or otherwise unlawful acts.
9

23.

The most popular web-browsers include Apple Safari, Microsoft Internet Explorer,

10 Google Chrome, and Mozilla Firefox.
11

24.

Every website is hosted by a computer server through which it sends and receives

12 communications with Internet users via their web-browsers to display web-pages on users’
13 monitors and screens, depending upon the user’s chosen computing device.
14

25.

The basic command web-browsers use to communicate with website servers is

15 called the ‘GET command’ or ‘GET request.’ For example, when an Internet user types
16 “www.cancer.org” into the navigation bar of their web-browser and hits ‘Enter’ (or, more
17 commonly, when an Internet user clicks on a hyper-link), the user’s browser sends a GET request
18 to the server for Cancer.org. This GET request instructs the Cancer.org server to send the
19 information contained on the Cancer.org homepage to the user’s web-browser for display.
20

26.

Another basic command is the ‘POST’ command, which is used when a user enters

21 data into a form on a website and clicks ‘Enter’ or the submit button. The POST command sends
22 the data entered into the form to the website.
23

27.

Each website server has an Internet Protocol Address (“IP address”). For example,

24 the IP address for the website www.cancer.org is “69.20.25.160.” An IP address, however, is not
25 the same thing as a Uniform Resource Locator, or more commonly, URL. In this case, Cancer.org
26 has just a single or a handful of IP addresses for all of the articles, essays, and other
27 communications hosted on its web-server. Thus, revealing that an Internet user sent a series of
28 communications to 69.20.25.160 only reveals the parties to the communication – the user and the
4
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1 American Cancer Society. In contrast, a full-string detailed URL (as explained below) reveals both
2 the parties to the communication and its content.
3

28.

A URL is composed of several different parts.2 For example, consider the

4 following URL:
5 http://www.cancer.org/cancer/testicularcancer/moreinformation/doihavetesticularcancer/do-i6 have-testicular-cancer-intro
7

a.

http://: This is the protocol identified by the web browser to the web server

8

which sets the basic language of the interaction between browser and server.

9

The back-slashes indicate that the browser is attempting to make contact

10

with the server;

11

b.

www.cancer.org: This is the name that identifies the website and

12

corresponding web server, with which the Internet user has initiated a

13

communication;

14

c.

15

/cancer/: This part of the URL indicates a folder on the web server, a part
of which the Internet user has requested;

16

d.

/testicularcancer/moreinformation/doihavetesticularcancer: This part of

17

the URL indicates a sub-folder on the web-server, a part of which the

18

Internet user has requested;

19

e.

/do-i-have-testicular-cancer-intro/: This part of the URL is the file name

20

for the particular file containing the information the Internet user has

21

requested;

22

f.

cancer/testicularcancer/moreinformation/doihavetesticularcancer/do-i-

23

have-testicular-cancer-intro: This combination of the folder, sub-folder,

24

and exact file name is called the “file path”.

25

29.

To further illustrate the distinction between an IP address and a full-string detailed

26 URL, consider an Internet user seeking information on testicular cancer. The user might type the
27

2

Microsoft.com, URL Path Length Restrictions (Sharepoint
28 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff919564(v=office.14).aspx.
5

Server

2010),
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1 exact search term, “Do I Have Testicular Cancer?” into a search engine, and one result they
2 would get is a link to the article at Cancer.org:
3
4
5
6
7 The user who clicks on the link “Do I Have Testicular Cancer?” would send a communication
8 through the user’s browser to the American Cancer Society seeking that information via a detailed
9 GET request and the full-string detailed URL:
10 http://www.cancer.org/cancer/testicularcancer/moreinformation/doihavetesticularcancer/do-i11 have-testicular-cancer-intro. The IP address for the American Cancer Society’s website would be
12 the same whether the user (a) went to the home page at Cancer.org or (b) sent this detailed request
13 for information via GET request and URL. When the user clicked on the link “Do I Have
14 Testicular Cancer?”, they would receive in return an essay from the American Cancer Society on
15 testicular cancer and its diagnosis.
16

30.

Although a single webpage appears on a user’s screen as a complete product, it is,

17 in reality, an assembled collage of independent parts. Each different part of a webpage – i.e. the
18 text, pictures, advertisements, sign-in box and other parts – often exist on different servers, which
19 are many times operated by separate companies.
20

31.

To display each part of a single webpage as one complete product, the host server

21 for the webpage leaves parts of the page blank to be filled in by third parties.
22

32.

Upon receiving a GET request from a user’s web-browser, the website server of the

23 recipient (in this case Cancer.org) contemporaneously re-directs the user’s web-browser to send a
24 separate but simultaneous GET command through a separate channel to the third-party responsible
25 for filling out a portion of the page it previously left blank.
26

33.

In addition to the GET command received by the third-party, the detailed URL

27 from the first domain is also often acquired by the third-party. These URLs are called ‘referer’
28 headers.
6
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1

34.

The contemporaneous re-direction and acquisition by the third-party through a

2 separate path is accomplished through each individual Internet user’s web-browser without any
3 further action or knowledge of the user.
4

35.

For example, on the Cancer.org homepage provided above, the user sends a GET

5 request from his browser to Cancer.org by typing the page address into his web-browser or by
6 clicking on a link to go to that page. Unbeknownst to the user sending the communication,
7 Cancer.org includes Facebook code. Upon Cancer.org receiving the GET request, Facebook’s
8 code directs Cancer.org to contemporaneously commandeer the user’s web-browser for
9 Facebook’s own purposes, ultimately commanding the user’s browser to send a separate but
10 simultaneous GET request through a different channel to Facebook’s server that is attached to an
11 exact duplicate of the user’s communication to Cancer.org, in order to fill out the small piece of
12 the Cancer.org webpage associated with Facebook.
13

36.

Without the knowledge, consent, or any action of the user, the entire process

14 happens in milliseconds, with the precise length of time from original GET request to complete
15 fulfillment determined by the user’s Internet speed and the speed of the website server and
16 server(s) to which the user’s referer URL and GET requests were contemporaneously re-directed
17 through separate channels. The third-parties acquire the communications before the website’s full
18 response is visible on the user’s web-browser.
19

37.

Many parts of the page left blank and hosted by other servers are not necessary for

20 websites to function, including, in this example from Cancer.org, the part relating to Facebook.
21

38.

Referer headers that include the full-string URL or content contained within the

22 GET request to the first-party website also are not necessary. Facebook has long understood this
23 and also that referer headers often include sensitive content. In 2010, on a Facebook blog,
24 Facebook engineer Matt Jones explained:
25
26
27
28

[S]ometimes referrers just don’t belong – maybe there is sensitive
information in a URL, or maybe a site just doesn’t wants its users’
browsers telling others how they use the site. … Facebook is one site
where referrers don’t belong. As part of our continued efforts to protect
users’ privacy, we proactively protect our users from exposing how they
navigated to an external site. To this end, we have designed a redirector …
7
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[which] remove[s] the referrer of the page on which the user clicked.

1

2 See “Protecting Privacy with Referrers” by Matt Jones, May 24, 2010, available by sending the
3 following

communication

in

a

web-browser:

https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-

4 engineering/protecting-privacy-with-referrers/392382738919/.
5

39.

As explained in more detail below, it is through similar processes that the health

6 care Defendants disclose (whether purposeful or not) and through which Facebook acquires the
7 Plaintiffs’ sensitive personally-identifiable medical communications without the Plaintiffs’
8 knowledge or consent and in violation of state and federal laws, the health care Defendants’
9 various privacy policies, and Facebook’s duty of good faith and fair dealing with its users.
10

B.

The Birth of Internet “Cookies”

11

40.

In the Internet’s formative years, advertising on websites followed the same model

12 as traditional newspapers. Just as a sporting goods store would choose to advertise in the sports
13 section of a traditional newspaper, advertisers on the early Internet paid for ads to be placed on
14 specific web pages based on the type of content displayed on the web page.
15

41.

Computer programmers eventually developed “cookies” – small text files that web-

16 servers can place on a person’s web-browser and computing device when that person’s web17 browser interacts with the website server. Cookies can perform different functions. Eventually,
18 some cookies were designed to track and record an individual Internet user’s communications with
19 and activities on websites across the Internet.
20
21
22

42.

In general, cookies are categorized by (1) duration, and (2) party.
a.

Cookie Classifications by “Duration”
i.

“Session cookies” are placed on a person’s computing device only

23

for the time period during which the user is navigating the website

24

that placed the cookie. The person’s web-browser normally deletes

25

session cookies when the user closes the browser.

26

ii.

“Persistent cookies” are designed to survive beyond a single

27

Internet-browsing session. The party creating the persistent cookie

28

determines its lifespan. As a result, a persistent cookie can record a
8
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1

person’s Internet browsing history and Internet communications for

2

years. By virtue of their lifespan, persistent cookies can track a

3

person’s communications with and activities on dozens or hundreds

4

of websites on the Internet. Persistent cookies are also sometimes

5

called “tracking cookies.”

6

b.

7

Cookie Classifications by “Party”
i.

“First-party cookies” are set on a user’s device by the website the

8

user intends to visit. For example, Cancer.org sets a collection of its

9

own cookies on user’s browsers when they visit any webpage on

10

Cancer.org. First-party cookies can be helpful to the user, server,

11

and/or website to assist with security, log-in, and functionality.

12

ii.

“Third-party cookies” are set by website servers other than the

13

website or server the user intends to visit. For example, the same

14

user who visits Cancer.org will also have cookies placed on their

15

device by third-party web-servers, including Facebook. Unlike first-

16

party cookies, third-party cookies are not typically helpful to the

17

user. Instead, third-party cookies typically work in furtherance of

18

data collection, behavioral profiling, and targeted advertising.

19

43.

Enterprising online data companies, such as Facebook, soon developed methods to

20 monetize and profit from cookies. Specifically, third-party persistent tracking cookies are used to
21 sell advertising that is customized based upon a particular person’s Internet communications and
22 browsing habits. To build an individual profile of Internet users, data companies like Facebook
23 assign each specific user a unique, or a set of unique, numeric or alphanumeric identifiers that are
24 associated with specific cookies Facebook has assigned to each of its users. Facebook users pay
25 for Facebook’s services with their personal information. Facebook’s users exchange something of
26 value – access to their personal information – for Facebook’s services and Facebook’s promise to
27 safeguard that personal information and to act in a manner that is reasonable, consistent with the
28 spirit of the bargain made, and does not abuse Facebook’s power to specify the terms of the
9
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1 contract.3
2

44.

Even where they do not allow advertisements, website owners often allow third-

3 party data-tracking companies to track users of their websites.
4

45.

When allowing third-party companies to track users and/or place advertisements on

5 their website, the host website provides the third-party access to communications it receives from
6 and sends to users. As described above, upon receiving a GET request from an Internet user’s
7 web-browser, the website’s server will, unbeknownst to that individual user, immediately and
8 contemporaneously re-direct the user’s browser to send a GET request to the third-party company,
9 who then uses the information to create detailed profiles of users. When a user has a third-party
10 cookie present on their web-browser, the third-party will be able to connect the communication to
11 a particular user.
12

46.

In many cases, the third-party receives the re-directed GET request and a copy of

13 the user’s communication to the first-party website before the first-party website’s response to the
14 user’s communication appears on the user’s screen. The re-directed communication from the user
15 includes a referrer header which identifies information about both the user’s communication and
16 the website’s response in the form of a URL.
17

47.

The transmission of such information is contemporaneous to the user’s

18 communication with the first-party website. However, because of “packet-switching” technology,
19 it also occurs while the information is in storage by the first-party website as well as the user’s
20 web-browser, ISP and personal computing device.
21

48.

The entire process occurs within milliseconds and the web page appears on the

22 Internet user’s browser as one complete product, without the person ever knowing that multiple
23 GET requests were executed by the browser at the direction of the web site server, and that first24 party and third-party cookies were placed and accessed in the user’s web-browser. Indeed, the user
25 has only made one knowing and purposeful communication – a GET request to the website with
26

3

However, as set forth herein, Facebook’s conduct evades the spirit of the bargain made between
27 Facebook and its users because Plaintiffs and the class members did not receive the benefit of the
bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration in the form of
28 their personal information which has ascertainable value to be proven at trial.
10
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1 which they intended to send and receive communications, such as Cancer.org.
2

C.

Illustrating How Internet Communications Happen

3

49.

As described above, an Internet communication consists of several separate but

4 simultaneous communications and signals.
5

50.

The following illustrates the flow of information that would occur for a user

6 sending and receiving communications from the American Cancer Society via Cancer.org relating
7 to stomach cancer diagnosis:
8

a.

9

The communication between the user and Cancer.org starts when the user
decides to seek information on the relevant topic from the American Cancer

10

Society.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

b.

The user can send the communication via one of two methods. The user can

22

either type – www.cancer.org/cancer/stomachcancer/detailedguide/stomach-

23

cancer-diagnosis into their toolbar, or the user can click on a link. For the

24

communication above, the link “Diagnosis Stomach Cancer” illustrated

25

below would send the user to the Cancer.org page for Stomach Cancer

26

Diagnosis.

27

http://www.cancer.org/cancer/stomachcancer/index.

This

screenshot

comes

from

the

webpage:

28
11
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1
2
3
4
5
6

c.

Whether the user manually types the URL into their toolbar or uses the

7

technological shortcut of clicking on their mouse, the intent and the effect is

8

the same: the user has sent a communication to Cancer.org seeking

9

information about “stomach cancer diagnosis.”

10

d.

Immediately upon the user hitting enter or clicking on their mouse, their

11

web-browser sends a ‘GET’ request to the American Cancer Society’s web-

12

server requesting the relevant information.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

e.

Unbeknownst to the user sending the communication, the American Cancer

21

Society webpage includes Facebook code, that upon ACS receiving the

22

GET request, Facebook’s code directs the American Cancer Society’s web-

23

server to, in turn, commander the user’s web-browser for Facebook’s own

24

purposes, ultimately commanding the user’s browser to send a separate but

25

simultaneous ‘GET’ request to Facebook that is attached to an exact

26

duplicate of the user’s communication to the American Cancer Society.

27
28

f.

Without the knowledge, consent, or any action of the user, the user’s webbrowser follows the commands received as a result of Facebook’s computer
12

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 5:16-cv-01282 Document 1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 17 of 92

1

code by sending a ‘GET’ request to Facebook’s server. This GET request,

2

however, is not identical to the request sent to the American Cancer

3

Society. However, it is accompanied by a ‘referer header’ that includes the

4

detailed URL which contains within it an exact copy of the GET request

5

that the user sent to the American Cancer Society’s web-server – as well as

6

information relating to the substance, purport, or meaning of the user’s

7

intended communication – i.e. “stomach cancer diagnosis.” In addition to

8

acquiring these two pieces of information, Facebook also accesses cookies

9

located on the user’s computer that personally identify the user to

10

Facebook. Through this process, Facebook has acquired knowledge that the

11

user is seeking information on stomach cancer diagnosis – attached to

12

personally-identifying

13

information before the communications between the user and the American

14

Cancer Society is completed.

information.

Facebook

acquires

all

of

this

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

g.

The American Cancer Society responds to the user’s request for information

23

on stomach cancer diagnosis by sending a 2,535 word essay on, not

24

surprisingly, how stomach cancer is diagnosed. Like the user’s original

25

action seeking information on stomach cancer diagnosis (whether by typing

26

it into the toolbar or clicking a hyper-link), the American Cancer Society

27

essay response involves sentient thought by a human being. It is more than

28

mere computer code directing software or hardware to take an action.
13
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1
2
3
4
5
51.

6

Significantly, Facebook is not a party to the user’s GET request to the American

7 Cancer Society for a “detailed guide” on “stomach cancer diagnosis.” Nor is Facebook a party to
8 the American Cancer Society’s 2,535 essay response to the user providing a “detailed guide” on
9 “stomach cancer diagnosis.”
52.

10

In effect, Facebook’s code operates as an automatic routing program that

11 commandeers the browsers of Internet users sending and receiving communications with medical
12 websites, causing those browsers to send exact duplicates of each user’s private communications
13 with those medical websites to Facebook in the middle of the communication between the user
14 and the medical website without the knowledge, consent, or any other action of the Internet user.
15

D.

The Value of the Personal Information Defendants Collect

16

53.

To data companies, cookies and the corresponding targeted ads they enable provide

17 an unprecedented opportunity to reach potential consumers. The value of the information that data
18 companies like Facebook take from people who use the Internet is well understood in the e19 commerce industry. Personal information is now viewed as a form of currency. Professor Paul M.
20 Schwartz noted in the Harvard Law Review:
Personal information is an important currency in the new millennium. The
monetary value of personal data is large and still growing, and corporate
America is moving quickly to profit from the trend. Companies view this
information as a corporate asset and have invested heavily in software that
facilitates the collection of consumer information.4

21
22
23
24

54.

Likewise, in the Wall Street Journal, privacy expert and fellow at the Open Society

25 Institute, Christopher Soghoian, noted:
26
27

4

Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055, 2056-57
28 (2004).
14
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The dirty secret of the Web is that the “free” content and services that
consumers enjoy come with a hidden price: their own private data.
Many of the major online advertising companies are not interested in the
data that we knowingly and willingly share. Instead, these parasitic
firms covertly track our web-browsing activities, search behavior and
geolocation information. Once collected, this mountain of data is
analyzed to build digital dossiers on millions of consumers, in some
cases identifying us by name, gender, age as well as the medical
conditions and political issues we have researched online. Although we
now regularly trade our most private information for access to socialnetworking sites and free content, the terms of this exchange were never
clearly communicated to consumers.5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

55.

In the behavioral advertising market, “the more information is known about a

9 consumer, the more a company will pay to deliver a precisely-targeted advertisement to him.”6
10

56.

In general, behaviorally targeted advertisements based on a user’s tracked Internet

11 activity sell for at least twice as much as non-targeted, run-of-network ads,7 produce 670 percent
12 more clicks on ads per impression than run-of-network ads, and are more than twice as likely to
13 convert users into buyers of an advertised product as compared to run-of-network ads.8
14

57.

The cash value of users’ personal information, including medical information, can

15 be quantified. In a recent study, researchers determined the value that American Internet users
16 place on their “health condition” is second only to “Passwords (login details)”:9
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

5

Julia Angwin, How Much Should People Worry About the Loss of Online Privacy?, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 15, 2011).
6

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf at 37.

7

NetworkAdvertising.org, Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More Than Twice As
Valuable,
Twice
As
Effective
As
Non-Targeted
Online
Ads,
25 http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAI_Beales_Release.pdf
24

26
27

8

Howard Beales, The Value of Behavioral Advertising, 2010.

http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf
9

Ponemon Institute, Privacy and Security in a Connected Life: A Study of US, European and
28 Japanese Consumers, March 2015.
15
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

E.

Facebook’s Data / Privacy Policy, Internet Tracking, and Business Model

16

58.

On sign-up, Facebook requires users to click a green Sign Up button:

59.

Facebook’s Terms, Data Policy, and Cookie Use (each highlighted in blue above)

17
18
19
20
21

22 acknowledgements link to provisions of a browse-wrap contract. However, because the disclaimer
23 is placed directly above the Sign-Up button it has a click-wrap quality and constitutes a valid
24 contract.
25

60.

Facebook’s Terms are contained in a document called the “Statement of Rights and

26 Responsibilities,” which has two paragraphs relating to privacy. The first such paragraph states:
27
28

Your privacy is very important to us. We designed our Data Policy to
make important disclosures about how you can use Facebook to share with
others and how we collect and can use your content and information. We
16
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encourage you to read the Data Policy, and to use it to help you make
informed decisions.

1
2
3
4

See Exhibit A for a copy of Facebook Terms.
61.

By using or accessing Facebook services, you agree that we can collect
and use such content and information in accordance with the Data Policy
as amended from time to time.

5
6
7

The next reference to privacy is at the end of the Terms document. It states:

62.

Facebook Data Policy page to which users are sent via the link above vaguely

8 discloses to users that it collects information about their Internet use on third-party websites:
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

63.

Facebook purports to have two data policies. One is the web-page to which users

20 are sent via the link at sign-up. A second “Full Data Policy” is provided on another page. See
21 Exhibit B for copies of both of Facebook’s Data Policies.
22

64.

To the extent to which there are differences in Facebook’s two data policies, the

23 Data Policy to which Facebook provides a link to users at sign-up is the only valid policy for legal
24 purposes.
25

65.

Facebook’s Data Policies fail to disclose that it tracks, collects, and intercepts

26 sensitive medical information and communications of its users.
27

66.

Facebook’s Data Policies fail to disclose that it tracks, collects, and intercepts

28 users’ communications with the websites of medical providers or other health care websites.
17
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1

67.

Facebook’s Data Policies fail to disclose that it tracks, collects, and intercepts

2 users’ communications in violation of the privacy policies at other websites.
3

68.

Facebook’s Data Policies fail to disclose that it tracks, collects, and intercepts

4 users’ communications in violation of laws designed to protect the privacy of sensitive health
5 information including, but not limited to, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
6 of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d, et seq. (“HIPAA”).
7

69.

Facebook’s Data Policies fail to disclose that it collects directly from Plaintiffs’

8 web-browsers individually-identifiable information about the users’ medical history and condition.
9

70.

Facebook’s Data Policies fail to disclose that it uses the Plaintiffs’ sensitive

10 medical information for direct marketing purposes, placing users into tranches of medically11 sensitive categories for sale to advertisers.
12

71.

Facebook’s “Cookie Use” page informs users that it uses cookies to individually

13 target users with advertising:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 See Exhibit C for a copy of the “Cookie Use” page.
28

72.

The relationship between Facebook and its users is governed by the documents to
18
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1 which it provides users with links at sign-up: its Terms, Data Policy, and Cookie Use web-pages.
2

73.

Facebook’s Terms page includes links at the bottom to pages which either do not

3 apply to ordinary users or which do not make any disclosure relating to its Social Plugins, which
4 allow Facebook users to push, for example, a “Like” button which Facebook explains lets “people
5 share pages and content from your site back to their Facebook profile with one click, so all their
6 friends can read them.” These pages include: Payment Terms, Platform Page, Facebook Platform
7 Policies, Advertising Policies, Self-Serve Ad Terms, Promotions Guidelines, Facebook Brand
8 Resources, How to Report Claims of Intellectual Property Infringement, Pages Terms, and
9 Community Standards, respectively.
10

74.

Separate from the pages and documents to which Facebook provides users with a

11 link at sign-up, it also maintains a “Help” page for “Social Plugins” in which it provides the
12 following:10
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

10

See https://www.facebook.com/help/443483272359009/.
19
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1

75.

The Facebook “Like” button disclosure above is not contained within the Terms,

2 Data Policy, or Cookie Use pages to which Facebook provides a link to users at sign-up.
3

76.

Plaintiffs are not aware of any direct link contained within the sign-up disclosures

4 to the information contained on the Help page for “What information does Facebook get when I
5 visit a site with the Like button?”
6

77.

Plaintiffs are not aware of any rational or likely way that a Facebook user might

7 find or be informed of the “What information does Facebook get when I visit a site with the Like
8 button?” page through the Terms, Data Policy, and Cookie Use pages. Instead, the only methods
9 of which Plaintiffs are aware would be if a user did a specific search for the information on the
10 Facebook website, or through the successful completion of a Byzantine maze: from the “Cookie
11 Use” link, the user could click on one of the 18 links on the left-hand portion of the page to which
12 there are no references in the body of the “Cookie Use” disclosure. Those 18 links on the “Cookie
13 Use” page include over 304 sub-links. If the user clicked the “Apps, Games, & Payments” link on
14 the left-hand column of the “Cookie Use” page, they would be shown a sub-menu with 10 links.
15 Of those 10 sub-menu links, there are another 19 sub-links. To reach the relevant page, a user
16 would have to click on “About Social Plugins,” the second-to-last of the 10 sub-menu links. The
17 user still would not be finished, but instead would be presented with three further links: “What are
18 social plugins?”, “How do social plugins work?” and “What information does Facebook get when
19 I visit a site with the Like button?” Finally, if the user clicked on the link, they would be presented
20 with the disclosure.
21

78.

Facebook does not disclose that it may track and intercept communications on

22 webpages that do not have a “Like” button or a designated “Share” button, but instead only a
23 Facebook icon. In fact, however, Facebook does track users on pages lacking a Like button.
24

79.

Facebook Tracking Does Not Occur on Most Medical Websites – Facebook,

25 however, does not track or intercept user communications with every website on which the
26 Facebook icon appears. For example, the websites for the Mayo Clinic (mayoclinic.org) and Johns
27 Hopkins Medicine (hopkinsmedicine.org) include a small Facebook icon on nearly every page, but
28 do not permit Facebook to track user communications. The same is true for hundreds if not
20
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1 thousands of other medical websites. This screen shot from the Mayo Clinic webpage,
2 http://www.mayoclinic.org/symptoms/fatigue/basics/definition/sym-20050894,

illustrates

the

3 point. Mayo Clinic does not disclose and Facebook does not track or intercept user
4 communications on this webpage despite the fact that a Facebook “Share” icon appears on it:
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

80.

Facebook earns revenue primarily through targeted advertising based on digital

26 dossiers Facebook builds on each of its users from tracking those users’ communications across
27 the Internet. In 2014, Facebook earned nearly $11.5 billion from advertising.
28

81.

As Facebook has explained in its annual report:
21
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We generate the substantial majority of our revenue from selling
advertising placements to marketers. Our ads let marketers reach people
on Facebook based on a variety of factors including age, gender, location,
and interests. Marketers purchase ads that can appear in multiple places
including in News Feed on mobile devices and personal computers, and on
the right-hand side of personal computers.

1
2
3
4

Our ad planning tools are designed to align with marketers’ business
goals. When marketers create an ad campaign on Facebook, they can
specify their budget, marketing objectives and the types of people they
want to reach. Facebook’s ad serving technology then dynamically
determines the best available ad to show each person based on those
dimensions.11

5
6
7
8
82.

Facebook’s digital profiles are built primarily through the use of cookies and other

9
tracking technologies. In particular, Facebook tracks users with the following cookies:
10
a.

The ‘c_user’ cookie is the Facebook equivalent of a Social Security

11
number. It is persistent and unique to each individual Facebook user.
12
b.

The ‘datr’ cookie is used by Facebook to individually identify each web-

13
browser used to access Facebook. It is persistent and unique to each
14
individual browser that accesses Facebook. In many cases, there is only one
15
‘c_user’ cookie associated with a ‘datr’ cookie. This is true for those
16
Facebook users who are the exclusive users of their personal computers. In
17
other cases, there are only a very few ‘c_user’ cookies associated with each
18
‘datr’ cookie. For example, a computer shared by a family with multiple
19
Facebook users will have multiple c_user cookies associated with the ‘datr’
20
cookie. Finally, public computers may have several unrelated c_user
21
cookies associated with a datr cookie. In 2015, Facebook began allowing
22
users to download portions of their Facebook data, including the last four
23
digits of ‘datr’ cookies Facebook associates with their user account.
24
Facebook’s data download process providing users with information on the
25
26

11

Facebook 2014 Annual Report (SEC Form 10-K) at 5. – available at:

27

http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-NJ5DZ/1372113521x0x852173/F61276C5-0AE928 49DE-BFD9-087398F85EC8/FB2014AR.pdf
22
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1

‘datr’ cookies associated with their account proves the ‘datr’ cookie does

2

more than identify a browser, but is also used by Facebook to personally-

3

identify users.

4

c.

5

The ‘lu’ cookie is used by Facebook to individually identify the last
Facebook user to log-in to Facebook using the browser at issue.

6

d.

The ‘fr’ cookie has a persistent value that is a combination of the encrypted

7

browser identification and an encrypted version of a user’s Facebook

8

identification.12

9

83.

Websites that design their pages in a way that permits Facebook to access these

10 tracking cookies also send Facebook information on communications that users are making
11 contemporaneous to users’ communications with the websites. The websites do so through the
12 process of re-direction explained above.
13

84.

Facebook does not publicly disclose to web-developers that placing its “Like” or

14 “Share” buttons on a web-page will automatically result in the website sending personally15 identifiable information of the websites’ users to Facebook connected to information about the
16 communications between the users and the website.13 See Exhibit D for a copy of Facebook’s
17 Developer pages.
18

85.

Facebook uses the c_user, datr, lu, and fr cookies combined with the ‘GET’

19 requests, ‘Referer headers’, and other information, including, but not limited to, IP addresses,
20 geographic identifiers, and personal information submitted by its users, to build detailed digital
21 dossiers of each user.
22

86.

Facebook acknowledges that it “scrapes” the pages of every website with social

23 buttons “every 30 days to ensure the properties are up to date.” Through this scraping process,
24 Facebook knows the contents of communications made between users and websites not just
25

12

See “Facebook Tracking Through Social Plug-ins,” Technical Report prepared for the Belgian
26 Privacy Commission, June 24, 2015. Available at:
https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fb_tracking/fb_plugins.pdf
27 13
Facebook’s public representations to web-developers regarding “plug-ins” like the “Like” and
28 “Share” buttons can be found here: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins
23
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1 through GET requests and URLs, but also the entirety of communications sent from the websites
2 back to each user.
3

87.

Through the scraping process, Facebook has actual or constructive knowledge of

4 the Privacy Policies at every website from which it tracks and intercepts user communications.
5

F.

Facebook Ad Targeting by Medical Condition

6

88.

As a result of its having collected the information set out above, Facebook then

7 allows advertisers to directly-target ads to narrow segments of users identified with interests and
8 actions in specified areas.
9

89.

Facebook uses the data it obtains directly from users through tracking and

10 monitoring their use of Facebook to sell advertising based on those communications and actions.
11 Facebook’s application for advertisers touts its ability to target users based on information
12 Facebook has collected about them relating to health care.14 For example, Facebook says it has
13 identified more than 84 million users “who have expressed an interest in or like pages related to
14 cancer awareness.” It boasts more than 92 million people “who have expressed an interest in or
15 like pages related to health care.” Facebook also publicly claims to be able to allow advertisers to
16 target ads to users “who have an interest in making donations to cancer causes” and to those who
17 have an interest in “making donations to health causes.”
18

90.

Facebook boasts the ability to target advertising based on “Interests,” telling

19 advertisers, “Facebook can help you reach specific audiences by looking at their interests,
20 activities, the Pages they have liked and closely related topics.” A partial chart of medical category
21 interest lists for sale for directing marketing of Facebook users in the United States is attached as
22 Exhibit E, which contains a summary chart of the Facebook users in the United States which
23 Facebook has placed in 154 separate medical categories for purposes of direct marketing.15 The
24 total number of individual U.S. Facebook users in these lists exceeds 255 million. Facebook’s
25

14

Facebook’s
application
for
26 https://www.facebook.com/advertising

advertisers

can

be

found

here:

15

Plaintiffs do not present Exhibit E as the entire universe of medical categories Facebook has
created for direct marketing, but instead merely as the categories for which Plaintiffs’ counsel
28 searched.
27

24
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1 medical conditions lists run the entire gamut of health conditions. There are 33 million Americans
2 for the “cough and cold relief” list and 10,000 in the “ectopic pregnancy” list. Other lists include,
3 but are not limited to: allergy relief, pregnancy, addiction, fever, cancer awareness, substance
4 abuse awareness, diabetes management, back pain, vaginitis, lupus, gestational diabetes, Hepatitis
5 C, bladder cancer, ADHD management, halitosis, rectal prolapse, cancer screening, HPV,
6 diagnosis of HIV/AIDS, head and neck cancer, erectile dysfunction, and herpes simplex virus.
7

91.

Plaintiffs are not aware of the total revenue Facebook derives from these lists, but,

8 upon information and belief, avers that per user revenue for each medical list significantly exceeds
9 the average per user revenue for non-medical lists.
10

G.

Why Internet Tracking Is Not Anonymous for Facebook Even if Cookies Were
Not Present

92.

Facebook can track its users even without the presence of cookies.

93.

Though industry insiders claim publicly that tracking is anonymous, experts

11
12
13
disagree. For instance, in a widely cited blog post for The Center for Internet and Society at
14
Stanford Law School titled “There is No Such Thing as Anonymous Online Tracking,” Professor
15
Arvind Narayanan explained:
16
In the language of computer science, clickstreams – browsing histories
that companies collect – are not anonymous at all; rather, they are
pseudonymous. The latter term is not only more technically appropriate, it
is much more reflective of the fact that at any point after the data has been
collected, the tracking company might try to attach an identity to the
pseudonym (unique ID) that your data is labeled with. Thus, identification
of a user affects not only future tracking, but also retroactively affects the
data that’s already been collected. Identification needs to happen only
once, ever, per user.

17
18
19
20
21

Will tracking companies actually take steps to identify or deanonymize
users? It’s hard to tell, but there are hints that this is already happening:
for example, many companies claim to be able to link online and offline
activity, which is impossible without identity.16

22
23
24
94.

25
26

Any company employing re-identification algorithms can precisely identify a

particular consumer:
16

“There is No Such Thing as Anonymous Online Tracking,” Arvind Narayanan, July 28, 2011, published
on the website of Stanford University Center for Internet and Society. Available at:
28 http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2011/07/there-no-such-thing-anonymous-online-tracking

27

25
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It turns out there is a wide spectrum of human characteristics that enable
re-identification: consumption preferences, commercial transactions, Web
browsing, search histories, and so forth. Their two key properties are that
(1) they are reasonably stable across time and contexts, and (2) the
corresponding data attributes are sufficiently numerous and fine-grained
that no two people are similar, except with a small probability.

1
2
3
4

The versatility and power of re-identification algorithms imply that terms
such as “personally identifiable” and “quasi-identifier” simply have no
technical meaning. While some attributes may be uniquely identifying on
their own, any attribute can be identifying in combination with others.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

95.

derived from cookies and other tracking technologies anonymous, stating that industry, scholars,
and privacy advocates have acknowledged that the traditional distinction between the two
categories of data (personally identifiable information and anonymous information) has eroded
and is losing its relevance.

12
13
14
15

96.

18
19

about a consumer’s web browser configuration – including the type of operating system used and
installed browser plug-ins and fonts – to uniquely identify and track the consumer.”17
97.

By using browser-fingerprinting alone, the likelihood that two separate users have

the same browser-fingerprint is one in 286,777, or 0.000003487 percent.18 This accuracy is
increased substantially where the tracking company also records a user’s IP address and unique
device identifier.

20
21

Another technological innovation used to identify Internet users is called “browser

fingerprinting,” a process by which companies like Facebook “gather and combine information

16
17

The Federal Trade Commission has recognized the impossibility of keeping data

98.

Another recent innovation, as Prof. Narayanan predicted, is for companies to

connect online dossiers with offline activity. As described by one industry insider:

22

With every click of the mouse, every touch of the screen, and every addto-cart, we are like Hansel and Gretel, leaving crumbs of information
everywhere. With or without willingly knowing, we drop our places of
residence, our relationship status, our circle of friends and even financial
information. Ever wonder how sites like Amazon can suggest a new book
you might like, or iTunes can match you up with an artist and even how

23
24
25
26
17

Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change at 36.
How Unique Is Your Web Browser? by Peter Eckersley,
28 https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf. Visited July 28, 2014.
27

18

26

available

at
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1

Facebook can suggest a friend?

2

Most tools use first-party cookies to identify users to the site on their
initial and future visits based upon the settings for that particular solution.
The information generated by the cookie is transmitted across the web and
used to segment visitors’ use of the website and to compile statistical
reports on website activity. This leaves analytic vendors – companies like
Adobe, Google, and IBM – the ability to combine online with offline data,
creating detailed profiles and serving targeted ads based on users’
behavior.19

3
4
5
6
99.

7

Facebook can track its users even without accessing cookies on user computers.

8 Every Facebook user provides Facebook with personally-identifiable information, including their
9 first and last name and hometowns. Through their use of Facebook, they also provide Facebook
10 with their contacts, email addresses, and likes.
100.

11

Beyond user’s names, email addresses, contacts, and likes, Facebook admits to

12 collecting information about users’ individual devices that it connects and intermingles with other
13 account information, such as a user’s name and email address:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
101.

24

Facebook connects this device and other information with the personal information

25 users provide during sign-up and through use of Facebook.com.
26
27

19

Tiffany
Zimmerman,
Data
Crumbs,
June
http://www.stratigent.com/community/analytics-insights-blog/data-crumbs
28 September 16, 2013) (emphasis added).
27

19,
(last

2012,
visited
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1

102.

Defendant Facebook’s data industry rival Google has admitted that, armed with this

2 information, even a simple IP address is personally-identifiable. On Google’s Public Policy blog
3 in 2008, then Google software engineer Alma Whitten explained:
[I]s an IP address personal data, or, in other words, can you figure out who
someone is from an IP address? A black-and-white declaration that all IP
addresses are always personal data incorrectly suggests that every IP
address can be associated with a specific individual. In some contexts this
is more true: if you’re an ISP and you assign an IP address to a computer
that connects under a particular subscriber’s account, and you know the
name and address of the person who holds that account, then that IP
address is more like personal data, even though multiple people could still
be using it. On the other hand, the IP addresses recorded by every website
on the planet without additional information should not be considered
personal data, because these websites usually cannot identify the human
beings behind these number strings.20

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

103.

Facebook has more information about its members than the ISPs identified by

12 Whitten have about their customers. Accordingly, to Facebook, IP addresses and unique device
13 identifiers are personally-identifiable information.
14

H.

Plaintiffs Are Without Knowledge Whether the Medical Defendants Were
Aware of Facebook’s Tracking and Interceptions

104.

Defendants ACS, ASCO, MRF, Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD

15
16

Anderson are aware of Facebook’s ubiquitous presence on the Internet.
17
105.

Plaintiffs are without knowledge as to whether Defendants ACS, ASCO, MRF,

18
Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson are aware that Facebook tracks and intercepts
19
communications between the Defendants and Internet users, including, in the case of the medical
20
providers Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic, and MD Anderson, their patients.
21
106.

Plaintiffs are without knowledge as to whether Defendants ACS, ASCO, MRF,

22
Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson profit directly or indirectly as a result of
23
Facebook’s tracking and interception of their communications to and from Internet users,
24
including, in the case of the medical providers Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic, and MD
25
Anderson, their patients.
26
27

20

See http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/02/are-ip-addresses-personal.html. Viewed
28 July 24, 2014.
28
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1

I.

2

Broken Privacy Promises at the Defendants’ Medical Websites
1.

3

107.

Broken Privacy Promises at Cancer.org21

Users of Cancer.org trust that the American Cancer Society will not share the

4 personal details of their cancer-related Internet search and browsing communications and activity
5 on the American Cancer Society’s website with third-parties.
6

108.

Defendant ACS does not disclose any relationship with Facebook on its website.

7

109.

Defendant ACS’s Privacy Policy at Cancer.org begins by assuring users, “The

8 American Cancer Society respects the privacy of every individual who uses ACS-owned
9 websites[.]” See Exhibit F for a copy of ACS’s Privacy Policy.
10

110.

Defendant ACS next informs users that it collects two types of information.

11 “Standard Web server traffic pattern information” which includes “[g]eneral traffic, site usage,
12 browser information, and length of stay information” that “is collected and stored in log files” and
13 which ACS promises “is shared externally only on an aggregated basis.” And “[p]ersonal
14 information” which ACS claims not to collect unless provided “voluntarily and knowingly.”
15

111.

ACS promises users it will only share health-related information and

16 communications with third-parties in the following limited circumstances:
17 / / /
18 / / /
19 / / /
20 / / /
21 / / /
22 / / /
23 / / /
24 / / /
25 / / /
26 / / /
27

21

http://www.cancer.org/aboutus/acspolicies/privacypolicies/internetprivacypolicies/internet28 privacy-policy
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

112.

ACS does not disclose in any fashion that it shares its users’ health-related

25 communications and information with Defendant Facebook.
26

113.

Facebook has actual and constructive knowledge of the Privacy Policy at

27 Cancer.org that promises not to divulge to Facebook or any other third-party the details of users’
28 “health-related information,” including communications.
30

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 5:16-cv-01282 Document 1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 35 of 92

1

114.

The policy is present on a publicly accessible page at Cancer.org which is scanned

2 or available to be scanned by Facebook’s web-crawlers and from which Facebook tracks,
3 intercepts, and acquires communications.
4

115.

Cancer.org does not contain Facebook “Like” buttons.

5

116.

Despite the above-stated privacy promises, users of the Cancer.org website have

6 their cancer-related search and browsing communications to and from the website disclosed to and
7 tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook connected to personally-identifiable information
8 for each Plaintiff.
9

117.

Plaintiff Winston Smith sought information, sent to, and received from Cancer.org

10 communications relating to melanoma and cancer treatment using his mobile device:
11 http://m.cancer.org/treatment/supportprogramsservices/index
12 http://m.cancer.org/treatment/findingandpayingfortreatment/understandinghealthinsurance/healthi
nsuranceandfinancialassistanceforthecancerpatient/health-insurance-and-financial-assistance-toc
13
14 http://m.cancer.org/treatment/findingandpayingfortreatment/understandinghealthinsurance/prescri
ptiondrugassistanceprograms/prescription-drug-assistance-programs-toc
15
http://m.cancer.org/cancer/lungcancer-smallcell/detailedguide/small-cell-lung-cancer-after16 lifestyle-changes
17

118.

This communication contains information relating to the substance, purport, and

18 meaning of the Plaintiff’s communication. To state the obvious, Plaintiff Winston Smith sent and
19 received communications with Cancer.org relating to lung cancer. In response, ACS sent back
20 communications providing Plaintiff with the information sought.
21

119.

Despite Cancer.org’s Privacy Policy, the Plaintiff’s communications to and from

22 Cancer.org were contemporaneously re-directed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by
23 Facebook through the process described above.
24

120.

Upon these and other communications, Plaintiff’s cancer-related communications

25 were disclosed to, tracked, and intercepted by Facebook through cookies and other identifiers,
26 including: c_user, lu, datr, fr, IP address, unique device identifiers, geographic locations, and
27 browser-fingerprinting.
28

121.

The exact content of Plaintiff’s communications were disclosed to, tracked,
31

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 5:16-cv-01282 Document 1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 36 of 92

1 intercepted, and acquired by Facebook with a referer header containing the exact contents of
2 Plaintiff’s communications, including the exact contents of search queries Plaintiff made on the
3 Cancer.org website.
4

2.

5

122.

Broken Privacy Promises at Cancer.net22

Users of Cancer.net trust that the American Society of Clinical Oncology will not

6 share the personal details of their cancer-related Internet search and browsing communications and
7 activity with ASCO with third-parties.
8

123.

Defendant ASCO does not disclose any relationship with Facebook on its website.

9

124.

The American Society of Clinical Oncology begins by assuring users it can be

10 trusted with their personal information, stating, “We recognize that cancer is a personal disease,
11 and we want you to feel as comfortable as possible visiting ASCO’s websites[.]” See Exhibit G for
12 a copy of ASCO’s Privacy Policy.
13

125.

In “Who Collects Information Through the Website,” ASCO informs users:
ASCO has engaged third party vendors to help us manage our web
presence and allow us to better serve our web visitors. Personal
information submitted to ASCO through third party managed pages may
be shared with these vendors as necessary for completing authorized
transactions. These third-party managed pages include the Journal of
Clinical Oncology website (jco.ascopubs.org), the Journal of Oncology
Practice website (jop.ascopubs.org), the Oncology Career Center website
(www.careers.jco.org), portions of the Career Opportunities at ASCO page
(www.asco.org/about-asco/working-asco), and portions of ASCO in
Action (ascoaction.asco.org).

14
15
16
17
18
19
126.

20

For users who visit Cancer.net “without registering,” ASCO promises it “will only

21 collect Non-Personal Information … about you through the use of first and third-party Cookies
22 and other technical means.”
127.

23

ASCO informs users that “providers of third-party Cookies may have the ability to

24 link your activities on the Website with your browsing activities elsewhere on the Internet.” It then
25 promises not to share PII with third-parties except under the following circumstances:
26 / / /
27
28

22

http://www.cancer.net/privacy-policy
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

128.

Cancer.net does not disclose in any fashion that it shares users’ health-related

18 information with Defendant Facebook.
19

129.

Facebook has actual and constructive knowledge of the Privacy Policy at

20 Cancer.net that promises not to divulge details of user communications with ASCO to Facebook.
21

130.

The policy is present on a publicly-accessible page at Cancer.net which is scanned

22 or available to be scanned by Facebook’s web-crawler and from which Facebook tracks,
23 intercepts, and acquires communications.
24

131.

Cancer.net does not contain Facebook “Like” buttons.

25

132.

Plaintiff Winston Smith sought information, sent to, and received from Cancer.net

26 communications relating to melanoma and cancer treatment:
27 http://www.cancer.net/navigating-cancer-care/financial-considerations/financial-resources
http://www.cancer.net/cancer-types/melanoma/treatment-options
28 http://www.cancer.net/navigating-cancer-care/diagnosing-cancer/tests-and-procedures/positron33
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1 emission-tomography-pet-scan
2

133.

These communications contain information relating to the substance, purport, and

3 meaning of the Plaintiff’s communications. To state the obvious, Plaintiff Winston Smith sent and
4 received communications from Cancer.net relating to (1) financial considerations for cancer, (2)
5 treatment options for melanoma, and (3) the positron emission tomography pet scan test for
6 detecting cancer.
7

134.

Despite Cancer.net’s privacy promises, the Plaintiff’s communications to and from

8 Cancer.net were contemporaneously re-directed, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook
9 through the process described above.
10

135.

Upon these and other communications, Plaintiff’s cancer-related communications

11 were disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook through cookies and other
12 identifiers including: c_user, lu, datr, fr, IP address, unique device identifiers, geographic
13 locations, and browser-fingerprinting.
14

136.

The exact content of Plaintiff’s communications were disclosed to, tracked,

15 intercepted, and acquired by Facebook with a referer header containing the exact contents of
16 Plaintiff’s communications, including the exact contents of search queries Plaintiff made on the
17 Cancer.net website.
18

3.

19

137.

Broken Privacy Promises at Melanoma.org23

Users of Melanoma.org trust that Defendant Melanoma Research Foundation will

20 not share the personal details of their cancer-related Internet search and browsing communications
21 and activity on the MRF website with third-parties.
22

138.

Defendant MRF does not disclose any relationship with Facebook on its website.

23

139.

Defendant MRF’s Privacy Policy at Melanoma.org begins by assuring users, “The

24 Melanoma Research Foundation is committed to protecting your privacy.” See Exhibit H for a
25 copy of MRF’s Privacy Policy.
26

140.

MRF defines “personal data” to mean “data that allows someone to identify or

27
28

23

http://www.melanoma.org/privacy-policy
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1 contact you, including, for example, your name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, as
2 well as any other non-public information about you that is associated with or linked to any of the
3 foregoing data.”
4

141.

MRF discloses that it uses cookies to track users for itself.

5

142.

MRF promises the following regarding disclosures to third-parties:

143.

MRF does not disclose in any fashion that it shares its users’ health-related

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14 communications and information with Facebook.
15

144.

Facebook had actual and constructive knowledge of the Privacy Policy at

16 Melanoma.org that promises not to divulge to Facebook their users’ personal data.
17

145.

The policy is present on a publicly accessible page at Melanoma.org which is

18 scanned or available to be scanned by Facebook’s web-crawlers and from which Facebook tracks,
19 intercepts, and acquires communications.
20

146.

Despite the above-stated privacy promises, users of the Melanoma.org website

21 have their cancer-related search and browsing communications to and from the website disclosed
22 to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook connected to information that is personally23 identifiable for each plaintiff.
24

147.

Plaintiff Winston Smith sought information, sent to, and received from

25 Melanoma.org communications relating to the diagnosis of melanoma:
26 http://www.melanoma.org/find-support/patient-community/mpip-melanoma-patients-informationpage/baking-soda
27
148. This communication contains information relating to the substance, purport, and
28
35
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1 meaning of the Plaintiff’s communications. To state the obvious, Plaintiff Winston Smith sent and
2 received communications with Melanoma.org relating to Melanoma and treatment with baking
3 soda. In response, MRF sent back communications providing the Plaintiffs’ with the information
4 sought.
5

149.

Despite Melanoma.org’s Privacy Policy, the Plaintiff’s communications to and

6 from Melanoma.org were contemporaneously re-directed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by
7 Facebook through the process described above.
8

150.

Upon these and other communications, Plaintiff’s cancer-related communications

9 were disclosed to, tracked, and intercepted by Facebook through cookies and other identifiers,
10 including: c_user, lu, datr, fr, IP address, unique device identifiers, geographic locations, and
11 browser-fingerprinting. These same communications were also acquired by Adobe through the use
12 of cookies and other identifiers.
13

151.

The exact content of Plaintiff’s communications were disclosed to, tracked,

14 intercepted, and acquired by Facebook with a referer header containing the exact contents of
15 Plaintiff’s communications, including the exact contents of search queries Plaintiff made on the
16 Melanoma.org website.
17

4.

Broken Privacy Promises at ShawneeMission.org and Other Adventist
Websites

18
152.

ShawneeMission.org is the website for Defendant Adventist Health System’s

19
hospital in Shawnee Mission, Kansas known as Shawnee Mission Hospital.
20
153.

Users of ShawneeMission.org, including patients of Shawnee Mission Hospital,

21
trust that Shawnee Mission and their health care providers will not disclose the personal details of
22
their health-related Internet communications to third-parties.
23
154.

Defendant Adventist creates a record of all health-related communications it

24
receives from and sends to Internet users, many of whom include its own patients, and connect the
25
communications to individual users through IP addresses and first-party cookies, including but not
26
limited to:
27
a.

atrfs;

28
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1

b.

atuvc;

2

c.

atuvs;

3

d.

utma;

4

e.

utmb;

5

f.

utmc; and

6

g.

utmz.

7

155.

Defendant Adventist does not disclose in any fashion that it shares users’ health-

8 related communications with Shawnee Mission with Facebook.
9

156.

Defendant Adventist promises not to share personally-identifiable information of

10 its patients and website users with third-parties except in limited circumstances which do not
11 apply. See Exhibit I for a copy of the ShawneeMission.org Privacy Policy which states:
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

As a general rule, we will not disclose your personally identifiable
information to any unaffiliated third party, except when we have your
permission or under special circumstances, such as when we need to treat
the information collected through this website as an asset in the event of
the merger of sale of Adventist, or a portion of our business. Your
personally identifiable information may be accessed by our management
information services team or an affiliated third party providing technical
support or maintenance for us.
If we offer services using or in conjunction with an unaffiliated third
party, we may need to share some or all of your personally identifiable
information with that unaffiliated third party for purposes of providing the
services to you. If you do not want your personally identifiable
information to be shared, you can choose not to use that particular service
or notify us that you do not wish your personally identifiable information
to be shared. In some circumstances we may be required by law to
disclose personally identifiable information. We will do so, in good faith,
only to the extent we believe to be required by law. We may also disclose
personally identifiable information in special cases when we have reason
to believe that disclosing this information is necessary to identify, contact
or bring legal action against a third party who may be violating our terms
and conditions governing the use of our website, or who may be
(intentionally or unintentionally) causing injury to or interference with
your or our rights or property or those of a third party.
We may share anonymous information with third parties. For example, we
may match our user information, such as gender and age preferences and
usage, with data of these third parties to help develop additional products
and services to offer through our website.
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1

157.

Defendant Adventists’ other hospital websites, including but not limited to,

2 keepingyouwell.com,

ctmc.org,

chippewavalleyhospital.com,

gordonhospital.com,

3 manchestermemorial.com, mplex.org, porterhospital.org, takoma.org, texashealthhugeley.org,
4 texashealth.org (“other Adventist hospital websites”), maintain substantially similar privacy
5 policies.
6

158.

Facebook has actual and constructive knowledge of the Privacy Policy at

7 ShawneeMission.org and the other Adventist hospital websites that fail to disclose the divulgence
8 to Facebook of the details of users’ and patients’ Internet communications.
9

159.

The ShawneeMission.org Privacy Policy, and other Adventist hospital website

10 privacy policies, are present on publicly-accessible pages which are scanned or available to be
11 scanned by Facebook’s web-crawler and from which Facebook tracks and intercepts
12 communications.
13

160.

Despite the above-stated privacy promises, users of the ShawneeMission.org

14 website and the other Adventist hospital websites have their health-related search and browsing
15 communications to and from Defendant Adventist disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired
16 by Facebook connected to information which personally-identifies each plaintiff.
17

161.

Plaintiff

Jane

Doe

sought

information,

sent

to,

and

received

from

18 ShawneeMission.org communications relating to pain management and her particular doctor:
19 http://www.shawneemission.org/health-services/center-for-pain-medicine#.VLk-FHv_4uM
20 http://www.shawneemission.org/orthopedic-spine-center#.VLk-R3v_4uN
21 http://www.shawneemission.org/find-a-doctor?doctor=Scott-E-Ashcraft-MD22 1407822869#.U77dgKhRa-k
23

162.

These communications contain information relating to the substance, purport, and

24 meaning of Jane Doe’s communications. To state the obvious, Plaintiff Jane Doe was sending and
25 receiving communications to and from Adventist relating to pain and medical treatment by Dr.
26 Scott Ashcraft at Shawnee Mission. In response to these communications requesting information,
27 Defendant Adventist sent back essay communications providing Jane Doe with the information
28 sought.
38

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 5:16-cv-01282 Document 1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 43 of 92

1

163.

Despite Adventist’s privacy promises, the Plaintiff’s communications to and from

2 ShawneeMission.org and the other Adventist hospital websites were contemporaneously re3 directed, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook through the process described above.
4

164.

Upon these and other communications, Plaintiff’s health-related communications

5 were disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook through cookies and other
6 identifiers, including: c_user, lu, datr, fr, IP address, unique device identifiers, geographic
7 locations, and browser-fingerprinting.
8

165.

The exact content of Plaintiff’s communications were disclosed to, tracked,

9 intercepted, and acquired by Facebook with a referer header containing the exact contents of the
10 Plaintiff’s communications, including the exact contents of search queries Plaintiff made on the
11 Adventist websites.
12
13

5.
166.

Broken Privacy Promises at BarnesJewish.org

BarnesJewish.org is the website for Defendant BJC Healthcare. Users of

14 BarnesJewish.org trust that BJC Healthcare will not disclose the personal details of their health15 related Internet communications with BJC to third-parties.
16

167.

Defendant BJC creates a record of all health-related communications it receives

17 from and sends to Internet users and connects the communications to individual users through IP
18 addresses, unique device identifiers, and first-party cookies, including:
19

a.

_utma;

20

b.

_utmb;

21

c.

_utmc;

22

d.

_utmz;

23

e.

_ga; and

24

f.

_ibp_phone_number.

25

168.

Defendant BJC does not disclose in any fashion that it shares users’ and patients’

26 health-related communications with Facebook.
27

169.

Defendant BJC’s Privacy Policy at BarnesJewish.org assures users that it complies

28
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1 with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).24 It then promises,
2 “We are required by law to protect the privacy of your protected health information.” It defines
3 “protected health information” to include “information that [BJC] create[s] or receive[s] that
4 identifies you and your past, present or future health status or care[.]”
5

170.

BJC notifies users that it discloses health information without written consent or

6 authorization for the purposes of treatment, payment of health services, health care operations, or
7 other special circumstances which are not present in this case.
8

171.

A separate document25 provides further details on BJC privacy on the Internet. See

9 Exhibit J for a copy of BJC’s Privacy Policy. It explains:
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

24

See http://www.barnesjewish.org/legal/hipaa-notice. Last visited April 10, 2015.

25

See http://www.barnesjewish.org/?id=96&sid=1. Last visited April 10, 2015.
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1

172.

Facebook has actual and constructive knowledge of the Privacy Policy at

2 BarnesJewish.org that promises not to divulge details of user communications to Facebook.
3

173.

The policy is present on publicly accessible pages at BarnesJewish.org which is

4 scanned or available to be scanned by Facebook’s web-crawler and from which Facebook tracks
5 and intercepts communications.
6

174.

Despite the above-stated privacy promises, users of the BarnesJewish.org website

7 have their health-related search and browsing communications to and from BJC disclosed to,
8 tracked, and intercepted by Facebook connected to information that personally-identifiable for
9 each plaintiff.
10

175.

Plaintiff Jane Doe II sought information, sent to, and received from

11 BarnesJewish.org communications relating to a sensitive medical condition, and her husband’s
12 doctor:
13 http://www.barnesjewish.org/physicians/details.aspx?physician=1033041
14 http://www.barnesjewish.org/physicians/details.aspx?physician=1027051
15

176.

These communications contain information relating to the substance, purport, and

16 meaning of the Plaintiff’s communications. To state the obvious, Plaintiff Jane Doe II was sending
17 and receiving communications to and from BarnesJewish.org relating to her family’s health care
18 treatment and their doctors: Steven R. Hunt, M.D. (identified on the BJC website as “1033041”)
19 and Sudhir Jain, M.D. (“1027051”). In response to these communications requesting information,
20 Defendant BJC sent back communications providing the Plaintiff with the information sought.
21

177.

Plaintiff Jane Doe II’s husband was a patient at BJC.

22

178.

Despite BJC’s privacy promises, the Plaintiff’s communications to and from

23 BarnesJewish.org were contemporaneously re-directed, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by
24 Facebook through the process described above.
25

179.

Upon these and other communications, Plaintiff’s health-related communications

26 were disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook through the following cookies
27 and other identifiers: c_user, lu, datr, fr, IP address, unique device identifiers, geographic
28 locations, and browser-fingerprinting. These same communications were also acquired by Twitter
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1 through the use of cookies and other identifiers.
2

180.

The exact content of Plaintiff’s communications were disclosed to, tracked,

3 intercepted, and acquired by Facebook with a referer header containing information relating to the
4 substance, purport, or meaning of Plaintiff’s communications, including the exact contents of
5 search queries Plaintiff made on the BarnesJewish.org website.
6

6.

7

181.

Broken Privacy Promises at ClevelandClinic.org

ClevelandClinic.org is the website for Defendant Cleveland Clinic. Users of

8 ClevelandClinic.org trust that the Cleveland Clinic will not disclose the personal details of their
9 health-related Internet communications with Cleveland Clinic to third-parties.
10

182.

Defendant Cleveland Clinic creates a record of all health-related communications it

11 receives from and sends to Internet users, many of whom include its own patients, and connects
12 the communications to individual users through IP addresses, unique device identifiers, and first13 party cookies, including:
14

a.

_utma;

15

b.

_utmz;

16

c.

_mkto_trk;

17

d.

ClrOSSID;

18

e.

ClrSCD; and

19

f.

CLrSSID.

20

183.

Defendant Cleveland Clinic does not disclose in any fashion that it shares’ users

21 and patients’ health-related communications with Facebook.
22

184.

Defendant Cleveland Clinic makes an unequivocal promise about the privacy of its

23 Internet users. See Exhibit K for a copy of Cleveland Clinic’s Privacy Policy, which states:26
24
25
26
27
28

26

See http://my.clevelandclinic.org/about-cleveland-clinic/about-this-website/privacy-security
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1

185.

Facebook has actual and constructive knowledge of the Privacy Policy at

2 ClevelandClinic.org that promises not to divulge to Facebook, or any other third-party unrelated to
3 Cleveland Clinic, user communications with Cleveland Clinic.
4

186.

The Cleveland Clinic Privacy Policy is present on a publicly-accessible page at

5 ClevelandClinic.org which is scanned or available to be scanned by Facebook’s web-crawler and
6 from which Facebook tracks, intercepts, and acquires communications.
7

187.

Despite the above-stated privacy promises, users of the ClevelandClinic.org

8 website have their health-related search and browsing communications to and from Cleveland
9 Clinic disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook connected to information that
10 personally-identifies each plaintiff.
11

188.

Plaintiff Jane Doe II sought information, sent to, and received from

12 ClevelandClinic.org communications relating to intestine transplants:
13 http://my.clevelandclinic.org/search/results?q=intestine%20transplant
14

189.

This communication contains information relating to the substance, purport, and

15 meaning of the Plaintiff’s communication. To state the obvious, Plaintiff Jane Doe II was sending
16 and receiving communications to and from ClevelandClinic.org relating to intestine transplants. In
17 response to this communication, Defendant Cleveland Clinic sent back communications providing
18 the Plaintiff with the information sought.
19

190.

Despite Cleveland Clinic’s privacy promises, the Plaintiff’s communications to and

20 from ClevelandClinic.org were contemporaneously re-directed, tracked, intercepted, and acquired
21 by Facebook through the process described above.
22

191.

Upon these and other communications, Plaintiff’s health-related communications

23 were disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook through the following cookies
24 and other identifiers, including: c_user, lu, datr, fr, IP address, unique device identifiers,
25 geographic locations, and browser-fingerprinting.
26

192.

The exact content of Plaintiff’s communications were disclosed to, tracked,

27 intercepted, and acquired by Facebook with a referer header containing the exact contents of the
28 Plaintiff’s communications, including the exact contents of search queries Plaintiff made on the
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1 ClevelandClinic.org website.
2

7.

3

193.

Broken Privacy Promises at MDAnderson.org

MDAnderson.org is the website for Defendant University of Texas MD Anderson

4 Cancer Center. Users of MDAnderson.org trust that it will not disclose the personal details of their
5 health-related Internet communications with MD Anderson to third-parties.
6

194.

Defendant MD Anderson creates a record of all health-related communications it

7 receives from and sends to Internet users, many of whom include its own patients, and connect the
8 communications to individual users through IP addresses, unique device identifiers, and first-party
9 cookies including:
10

a.

_utma;

11

b.

_utmz;

12

c.

s_nr;

13

d.

s_vi; and

14

e.

fsr.r.

15

195.

Defendant MD Anderson does not disclose in any fashion that it shares users’ and

16 patients’ health-related communications with Facebook.
17

196.

Defendant MD Anderson’s Privacy Policy assures users that it complies with

18 HIPAA. It defines “protected health information” to include “any information, whether oral,
19 written or recorded in electronic form, that is created or received by us as health care providers
20 that identifies you and relates to your past, present or future physical or mental health or condition,
21 treatment, or payment for your healthcare.”27
22

197.

MDAnderson makes an unequivocal promise about the privacy of its Internet users.

23 See Exhibit L for copy of MDAnderson’s Privacy Policy. It states, in bold-faced type on its
24 website Privacy Policy28 page:
25
26
27

27

See
http://www.mdanderson.org/about-us/legal-and-policy/legal-statements/legal-statements-jointnotice-of-privacy-practices.html. Last visited December 9, 2015.
28

See http://www.mdanderson.org/about-us/legal-and-policy/site-policies/site-policies-privacy-policy.html.

28 Last visited December 9, 2015.
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1
2
3
198.

Facebook has actual and constructive knowledge of the Privacy Policy at

4
MDAnderson.org that promises not to divulge details of user communications to Facebook.
5
199.

MD Anderson’s Privacy Policy is present on a publicly accessible page at

6
MDAnderson.org which is scanned or available to be scanned by Facebook’s web-crawlers and
7
from which Facebook tracks, intercepts, and acquires communications.
8
200.

MDAnderson does not contain Facebook “Like” buttons.

201.

Despite the above-stated privacy promises, users of the MDAnderson.org website

9
10
have their health-related search and browsing communications to and from MD Anderson
11
disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook connected to information that
12
personally-identifies each plaintiff.
13
202.

Plaintiff Winston Smith sought information, sent to, and received from

14
MDAnderson.org communications relating to metastatic melanoma:
15
http://www2.mdanderson.org/cancerwise/2012/06/metastatic-melanoma-a-wife-reflects-on16
husbands-shocking-diagnosis.html
17
203.

This communication contains information relating to the substance, purport, and

18
meaning of the Plaintiff’s communication. To state the obvious, Plaintiff Winston Smith was
19
sending and receiving communications to and from MDAnderson.org relating to “metastatic
20
melanoma.” In response to this communication, Defendant MDAnderson sent back
21
communications providing Plaintiff Winston Smith with the information sought.
22
204.

Despite MDAnderson’s privacy promises, the Plaintiff’s communications to and

23
from MDAnderson.org were contemporaneously re-directed, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by
24
Facebook through the process described above.
25
205.

Upon this and other communications, Plaintiff’s health and cancer-related

26
communications were disclosed to, tracked, intercepted, and acquired by Facebook through the
27
following cookies and other identifiers: c_user, lu, datr, fr, IP address, unique device identifiers,
28
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1 geographic locations, and browser-fingerprinting.
2

206.

The exact content of Plaintiff’s communications were disclosed to, tracked,

3 intercepted, and acquired by Facebook with a referer header containing the exact contents of
4 Plaintiff’s communications, including the exact contents of search queries Plaintiff made on the
5 MDAnderson.org website.
6

J.

Application of HIPAA to the Actions of the Health Care Provider Defendants

7

207.

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act protects the privacy of

8 medical records. It was enacted to establish “for the first time, a set of basic national privacy
9 standards and fair information practices that provides all Americans with a basic level of
10 protection and peace of mind that is essential to their full participation in their care.” Accordingly,
11 HIPAA “sets a floor of ground rules for health care providers … to follow, in order to protect
12 patients and encourage them to seek needed care.”29
13

208.

Under HIPAA, “A covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose

14 protected health information, except as permitted” by HIPAA. 45 C.F.R. §164.502. “Protected
15 health information” is defined as “individually identifiable health information that is transmitted
16 by electronic media, maintained in electronic media, or transmitted or maintained in any other
17 form of media.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. “Health information” is defined as “any information …
18 whether oral or recorded in any form or medium that … (1) is created or received by a health care
19 provider … and (2) [r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of
20 an individual[.]” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. “Individual” under HIPAA is not limited to current or
21 former patients of the covered entity, but is instead defined as “the person who is the subject of
22 protected health information.”
23

209.

Whether information is “individually identifiable” under HIPAA is governed by 45

24 C.F.R. §164.514, which sets forth a list of “identifiers” that must be “removed” before a covered
25 entity may determine that the information “is not individually identifiable health information.” 45
26 C.F.R. § 164.514(b). The list of “identifiers” which must be removed includes the following
27

29

See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,46228 64 (Dec. 28. 2000).
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1 “identifiers of the individual or of relatives … or household members of the individual:”
2

a.

Names, § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A);

3

b.

All geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(B);

4

c.

Device identifiers and serial numbers, § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(M);

5

d.

Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs), § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(N);

6

e.

Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers, § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(O); and

7

f.

Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code [with an

8
9

inapplicable exception], §164.514(b)(2)(i)(R).
210.

A “covered entity must obtain an authorization for any use or disclosure of

10 protected health information for marketing” with two inapplicable exceptions. 45 C.F.R. §
11 164.508(3)(i). “Marketing” is defined as “to make a communication about a product or service that
12 encourages recipients of the communication to purchase or use the product or service[.]” 45 C.F.R.
13 § 164.501.
14

211.

A “covered entity must obtain an authorization for any disclosure of protected

15 health information which is a sale of protected health information[.]” 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(4)(i).
16 The “sale of protected health information” means “a disclosure of protected health information by
17 a covered entity … where the covered entity … directly or indirectly receives remuneration from
18 or on behalf of the recipient of the protected health information in exchange for the protected
19 health information[.]” 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B).
20
21

212.

A valid HIPAA authorization must contain:
a.

22
23

information in a specific and meaningful fashion;
b.

24
25

A description of the information to be used or disclosed that identifies the

The name or other specific identification of the person(s), or class of
persons, authorized to make the requested use or disclosure;

c.

The name or other specific identification of the person(s), or class of

26

persons, to whom the covered entity may make the requested use or

27

disclosure;

28

d.

A description of each purpose of the requested use or disclosure;
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1

e.

2

An expiration date or an expiration event that relates to the individual or the
purpose of the use or disclosure;

3

f.

The signature of the individual and the date;

4

g.

Notice of the individual’s right to revoke the authorization in writing; the

5

covered entity’s ability or inability to condition treatment, payment,

6

enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on the authorization; and the potential

7

for information disclosed to be subject to re-disclosure by the recipient;

8

h.

The authorization must be written in plain language; and

9

i.

The covered entity must provide the individual with a copy of the signed

10
11

authorization.
213.

HIPAA violations are subject to civil and criminal penalties. The civil penalty for

12 an unknowing HIPAA violation is a fine between $100 and $50,000 for each violation with an
13 aggregate cap of $1.5 million “for identical violations during a calendar year.” 45 C.F.R. §
14 160.404(b)(2). The criminal provisions contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 specify:
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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1

214.

Defendants Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson are “covered

2 entities” governed by HIPAA.
3

215.

The named-Plaintiffs and the classes are “individuals” protected by HIPAA with

4 respect to their communications with covered entities.
5

216.

The Plaintiffs’ communications with the covered entities constitutes “protected

6 health information.”
7

a.

The information accessed and Plaintiffs’ communications sent to and

8

received from ShawneeMission.org and the other Adventist hospital

9

websites , BarnesJewish.org, ClevelandClinic.org, MDAnderson.org that

10

were, respectively, created by Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic, and MD

11

Anderson. Further, the plaintiffs’ communications with these websites were

12

recorded by Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson in a form

13

that was created and received by each respective Defendant. In particular,

14

the covered entity websites each tracked, created, and recorded logs of the

15

Plaintiffs’ activities on the health care websites through the websites’ own

16

use of cookies and other personally-identifying information including, but

17

not limited to, device identifiers and IP addresses.

18

b.

The Plaintiffs’ communications with Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic, and

19

MD Anderson related to their “past, present, and future physical or mental

20

health or condition.”

21

c.

The information tracked, created, and recorded by Adventist, BJC,

22

Cleveland Clinic, and MD Anderson included:

23

i.

Geographic subdivisions smaller than a state;

24

ii.

Device identifiers and/or serial numbers;

25

iii.

Web Universe Resource Locators (URLs);

26

iv.

IP addresses; and

27

v.

Other unique identifying numbers, characteristics, or codes –

28

including, but not limited to, Internet cookies.
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1

217.

Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson, whether purposefully or

2 negligently, designed their websites in a manner that disclosed to Facebook the communications
3 Plaintiffs sent to and received from them.
4

218.

The disclosures included details on the communication through referer headers and

5 GET requests with sensitive information relating to “past, present, or future” medical conditions.
6

219.

Defendant Facebook learned further details of the communications through its web-

7 crawlers.
8

220.

The disclosures to Facebook also included personally-identifiable information

9 attached to the sensitive medical information. This PII took the form of geographic subdivisions
10 smaller than a state, device identifiers and/or serial numbers, URLs, IP addresses, and other unique
11 identifying numbers, characteristics, and codes – including but not limited to Internet cookies.
12

221.

Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic, and MD Anderson failed to obtain the express

13 written authorization required by HIPAA for disclosure relating to marketing, sale, or any other
14 purpose not specifically exempted by HIPAA.
15

222.

Facebook has actual or constructive knowledge that Defendants Adventist, BJC,

16 Cleveland Clinic, and MD Anderson are health care providers and covered entities under HIPAA.
17

223.

Defendants Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson reference HIPAA

18 policies on their websites.
19

224.

The websites of Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson, are scanned

20 or available to be scanned by Facebook’s web-crawler.
21

225.

Because Adventist, BJC, Cleveland Clinic and MD Anderson did not receive the

22 express written consent of the Plaintiffs, in addition to violating various other state and criminal
23 laws, the actions and processes described in this complaint violated HIPAA.
24

K.

California Civil Code Section 1798.91 – Consent for Direct Marketing Based
on Medical Information

226.

California Civil Code section 1798.91 provides that “[a] business may not request

25
26
in writing medical information directly from an individual regardless of whether the information
27
pertains to the individual or not, and use, share or otherwise disclose that information for direct
28
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1 marketing purposes” unless it first “disclose[s] in a clear and conspicuous manner that it is
2 obtaining the information to market or advertise products, goods, or services to the individual” and
3 “obtain[s] the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains … to permit his
4 or her medical information to be used or shared to market or advertise products, goods, or services
5 to the individual.”
6

227.

Facebook is a business.

7

228.

Per Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91(a)(1), “direct marketing purposes” means “the use of

8 personal information for marketing or advertising products, goods, or services directly to
9 individuals.” Facebook collects information from Plaintiffs and their computing devices for
10 purposes of direct marketing and advertising products, goods, and services at Facebook.com.
11

229.

Per Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91(a)(2), “medical information” means “any

12 individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical form, regarding the individual’s
13 medical history, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health care professional.” “Individually
14 identifiable” means “the medical information includes of contains any element of personal
15 identifying information sufficient to allow identification of the individual, such as the individual’s
16 name, address, electronic mail address, telephone number, or social security number, or other
17 information that, alone or in combination with other publicly available information, reveals the
18 individual’s identity.” The definition of “medical information” includes an exception, and “does
19 not mean a subscription to, purchase of, or request for a periodical, book, pamphlet, video, audio,
20 or other multimedia product or non-profit association information.”
21

230.

The Plaintiffs’ communications with the health care Defendants contain “medical

22 information” which is individually identifiable and protected by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91(a)(2).
23 This collection by Facebook includes communications seeking details on specific health care
24 providers, i.e. doctors, employed by medical websites and entities covered by HIPAA. It also
25 includes the mere fact that Plaintiffs are making communication with the health care Defendant
26 and/or any of its specialties or that they are seeking information on how to make payments. For
27 example, Facebook collects information from the Plaintiffs regarding their communication with
28 BJC on the following webpages:
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1



http://www.barnesjewish.org/

2



http://www.barnesjewish.org/physicians/

3



http://www.barnesjewish.org/physicians/results.aspx?find=liver

4



https://www.barnesjewish.org/requestappointment/

5



http://www.barnesjewish.org/cancer-center

6



http://www.barnesjewish.org/physicians/details.aspx?physician=1022180

7



http://www.bjc.org/For-Patients-Visitors/Financial-Assistance-Billing-

8

Resources/Online-Bill-Pay

9 Substantially similar communications are taken and recorded by Facebook at the other health care
10 Defendants and other websites of “covered entities” under HIPAA. These communications relate
11 to the Plaintiffs’ “medical history, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health care professional”
12 protected by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91(a)(2).
13

231.

Facebook collects the Plaintiffs’ communications with the health care Defendants

14 without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent through the use of computer code designed by Facebook
15 that instructs the health care Defendants webpages to re-direct the Plaintiffs’ communications to
16 Facebook from the Plaintiffs’ web-browsers.
17

232.

Plaintiffs’ interests and activities on Facebook are also collected directly by

18 Facebook and used to place the Plaintiffs into medical interest categories for purposes of direct
19 marketing. These interests and activities relating to Plaintiffs’ or another individual’s “medical
20 history or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health care professional” is “medical information”
21 protected by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91(a)(2).
22

233.

Per Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91(a)(3), “clear and conspicuous” means “in larger type

23 than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same
24 size, or set off from the surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call
25 attention to the language.” Facebook did not make any disclosures that it tracks and takes medical
26 information of the Plaintiffs for purposes of direct marketing. To the extent it claims it provided
27 any such disclosure, it did not do so in a “clear and conspicuous” manner. Facebook makes the
28 following statements in its Data Policy about using the information it collects directly from its
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1 users for purposes of direct marketing.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

234.

Facebook also does not obtain written consent to collect medical information for

28 purposes of direct marketing. Facebook’s Terms, Data Policy, and Cookie use pages do not
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1 apprise users that Facebook collects their medical information in violation of medical websites’
2 privacy policies and HIPAA.
3 V.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

4

235.

This putative class action is brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

5 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all similarly
6 situated individuals as representatives of a class and subclasses defined as follows:
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Facebook Medical Tracking Class: All registered users of Facebook who
communicated with medical organizations and providers through their webbrowsers and who did not affirmatively consent to the release of those
communications to Facebook.
Facebook Medical Direct Marketing Class: All registered users of Facebook
who communicated with medical organizations and providers through their webbrowsers and who did not affirmatively consent to the release of those
communications to Facebook and who were placed into advertising interest
categories by Facebook based on that information for direct marketing purposes.
Cancer.org Subclass: All registered users of Facebook who communicated with
the American Cancer Society through their web-browsers via the website
Cancer.org and who did not affirmatively consent to the release of those
communications to Facebook.
Cancer.net Subclass: All registered users of Facebook who communicated with
the American Society of Clinical Oncology through their web-browsers via the
website Cancer.net and who did not affirmatively consent to the release of those
communications to Facebook.
Melanoma.org Subclass: All registered users of Facebook who communicated
with the Melanoma Research Foundation through their web-browsers via the
website Melanoma.org and who did not affirmatively consent to the release of
those communications to Facebook.
Adventist Subclass – All registered users of Facebook who communicated with
Adventist Health System through their web-browsers via the websites
ShawneeMission.org, keepingyouwell.com, ctmc.org, chippewavalleyhospital.com,
gordonhospital.com, manchestermemorial.com, mplex.org, porterhospital.org,
takoma.org, texashealthhugeley.org, and texashealth.org
and who did not
affirmatively consent to the release of those communications to Facebook.
BJC Subclass – All registered users of Facebook who communicated with BJC
Healthcare through their web-browser via the websites BarnesJewish.org and
BooneHospital.com, and who did not affirmatively consent to the release of those
communications to Facebook.

27
28

Cleveland Clinic Subclass – All registered users of Facebook who communicated
with the Cleveland Clinic through their web-browser via the website
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ClevelandClinic.org and who did not affirmatively consent to the release of those
communications to Facebook.

1
2

MD Anderson Subclass – All registered users of Facebook who communicated
with the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center through their webbrowser via the website MDAnderson.org and who did not affirmatively consent to
the release of those communications to Facebook.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

236.

Plaintiff Winston Smith meets the requirements of both Facebook classes and the

Cancer.org, Cancer.net, Melanoma.org and MD Anderson subclasses.
237.

Plaintiff Jane Doe meets the requirements of the Facebook classes and the

Adventist subclass.
238.

Plaintiff Jane Doe II meets the requirements of the Facebook classes and the BJC

and Cleveland Clinic subclasses.
239.

The particular members of the proposed Classes are capable of being described

without managerial or administrative difficulties.

identifiable from the information and records in the possession or control of the Defendants.
240.

The members of the Classes are so numerous that individual joinder of all members

is impractical. This allegation is based upon information and belief that Defendants disclosed to
and Facebook tracked and intercepted the health and cancer-related Internet search and browsing
communications of millions of users.
241.

There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that predominate over

any questions affecting only individual members of the Classes or Subclasses, and, in fact, the
wrongs suffered and remedies sought by the Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes and
Subclasses are premised upon an unlawful scheme participated in by each of the Defendants. The
principal common issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
a.

24

27

The extent to which the health care websites disclosed Plaintiffs’
personally-identifiable cancer and other health information to Defendant

25
26

The members of the Classes are readily

Facebook;
b.

The extent to which the disclosures and interceptions violated the privacy
policies of the health care websites and Facebook.com;

28
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1

c.

Whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs under the federal Wiretap Act;

2

d.

Whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for Intrusion Upon Seclusion;

3

e.

Whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for violation of the California

4

Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code § 631, et. seq.;

5

f.

6

Whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs under California’s constitutional
cause-of-action for invasion of privacy;

7

g.

Whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for negligence per se as a result

8

of Defendants’ violations of the Wiretap Act, the Pen Register Act, the

9

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, and

10

for Facebook only, Cal. Civ. Code §1798.91, relating to disclosures

11

required for non-health care businesses to use, share, or disclose medical

12

information for purposes of direct marketing;

13

h.

14

Whether the health care Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for the negligent
disclosure of confidential information;

15

i.

16

Whether the health care Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for breach of a
fiduciary duties of confidentiality;

17

j.

18

Whether Defendant Facebook is liable to Plaintiffs for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing;

19

k.

Whether Defendant Facebook is liable to Plaintiffs for quantum meruit;

20

l.

The nature and extent of all statutory penalties or damages for which the

21

Defendants are liable to the Class members;

22

m.

Whether the conduct complained of herein should be enjoined; and

23

n.

Whether punitive damages are appropriate.

24

242.

The common issues predominate over any individualized issues such that the

25 putative classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.
26

243.

Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the members of the Classes and based on

27 the same legal and factual theories.
28

244.

Class treatment is superior in that the fairness and efficiency of class procedure in
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1 this action significantly outweighs any alternative methods of adjudication. In the absence of class
2 treatment, duplicative evidence of Defendants’ alleged violations would have to be provided in
3 thousands of individual lawsuits. Moreover, class certification would further the policy underlying
4 Rule 23 by aggregating class members possessing relatively small individual claims, thus
5 overcoming the problem that small recoveries do not incentivize plaintiffs to sue individually.
6

245.

The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the

7 members of the Class. The Plaintiffs have suffered injury in their own capacity from the practices
8 complained of and are ready, willing, and able to serve as Class representatives. Moreover,
9 Plaintiffs’ counsel is experienced in handling class actions and actions involving unlawful
10 commercial practices, including such unlawful practices on the Internet. Neither the Plaintiffs nor
11 their counsel has any interest that might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. The
12 Plaintiffs’ interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the Class members they
13 seek to represent.
14

246.

Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is

15 appropriate because the Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the Class such
16 that final injunctive relief is appropriate respecting the Class and Subclass as a whole.
17

247.

Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is

18 appropriate in that the Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek monetary damages, common
19 questions predominate over any individual questions, and a class action is superior for the fair and
20 efficient adjudication of this controversy. A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious
21 administration of Class members’ claims and economies of time, effort, and expense will be
22 fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. Moreover, the individual members of the
23 Class are likely to be unaware of their rights and not in a position (either financially or through
24 experience) to commence individual litigation against these Defendants.
25

248.

Alternatively, certification of a plaintiff class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26 23(b)(1) is appropriate in that inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
27 members of the Class would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants or
28 adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class as a practical matter would be
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1 dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication or would
2 substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
3 VI.

CAUSES OF ACTION

4

COUNT I – WIRETAP ACT

5

(Against All Defendants)

6

249.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

7

250.

The Wiretap Act prohibits the intentional interception of the contents of any wire,

8 oral, or electronic communication through the use of a device.
9

251.

The Wiretap Act protects both the sending and receipt of communications.

10

252.

The Wiretap Act provides a private right of action for any person whose wire, oral,

11 or electronic communication (whether being sent or received) is intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
12

253.

Facebook’s actions in intercepting, tracking, and acquiring user communications at

13 medical websites in violation of those websites’ privacy policies, and, for covered entities,
14 HIPAA, was intentional in that Facebook purposefully designed its code to track, intercept, and
15 acquire user communications connected to personally-identifiable information.
16

254.

Facebook’s tracking involved the acquisition of information relating to the

17 substance, purport, or meaning of communications that Plaintiffs were in the process of sending to
18 and receiving from the medical websites. Facebook’s acquisition of the information was
19 contemporaneous to the sending and receipt of said communications and Facebook, in fact,
20 acquired the copy of the contents of the communications before the communications between the
21 plaintiffs and the medical websites were completed.
22

255.

Facebook’s acquisition of the plaintiffs’ communications to and from the medical

23 websites was accomplished through a separate channel than the path of the actual communication
24 between the users and the medical websites.
25

256.

Facebook’s acquisitions included “contents” of electronic communications that

26 Plaintiffs sent to and received from the medical websites in the form of (1) GET requests which
27 included URL file paths, (2) detailed URL requests, and (3) search queries which Plaintiffs sent to
28 the medical websites and for which Plaintiffs received communications from the medical websites.
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1 For example, with the referer URL
2

http://www2.mdanderson.org/cancerwise/2012/06/metastatic-melanoma-a-wife-reflectson-husbands-shocking-diagnosis.html

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

the phrase “metastatic melanoma a wife reflects on husbands shocking diagnosis” contains
information relating to the substance, purport, and meaning of the communications between the
user and MD Anderson.
257.

The transmission of data between Plaintiffs and the medical websites that Facebook

tracked, intercepted, and acquired without authorization involves the “transfer of signs, signals,
writing, … data [and] intelligence of [some] nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects interstate commerce[,] and
were therefore “electronic communications” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
258.

For

a.

issue,

the

Plaintiffs

began

the

By directly typing the exact URL into their web-browser, then taking the
affirmative action of either hitting the Enter button or clicking on their

15

mouse to send the communication;

16
b.

17

By conducting a search either at the medical website or some other website
seeking information relating to a topic and then clicking on a hyperlink with

18

text indicating that clicking on the link will send a communication to the

19

medical website seeking information on the topic and for which the

20

recipient website will send a return communication with information about

21

the topic requested; or

22
c.

23

By clicking on a hyperlink on a different webpage where the hyperlink
indicates that clicking on it will send a communication to the recipient

24

medical website linked to the information that the Plaintiff is seeking and

25

that is referenced in the hyper-link.

26

28

at

communications to the medical websites via one of three methods:

14

27

each communication sequence

259.

Each method of sending a communication on their web-browser involves a choice

by the plaintiff Internet user and Class Member to send a communication relating to the topic.
59

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 5:16-cv-01282 Document 1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 64 of 92

1 Users do not randomly send or receive these communications, but instead make them through
2 conscious communications and requests for specific information. Whether an Internet user types
3 the full-string URL into their browser or uses the technological short-cut of left-clicking on a
4 hyperlink with their mouse, the intent and effect is the same: they are sending a communication
5 and taking an action which causes the “transfer” of signs, signals, data, and other intelligence to
6 the health care Defendants from which they are also receiving communications in return.
7

260.

The words and other data contained within URL file paths are similarly not random

8 but instead are the result of conscious choices and communications made by the health care
9 Defendants.
10

261.

11

The following constitute “devices” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2510(5):
a.

The cookies and other tools the Facebook used to track the Plaintiffs’

12

communications while they were communication with the medical

13

websites;

14

b.

The Plaintiffs’ web-browsers;

15

c.

The Plaintiffs’ computing devices;

16

d.

Facebook’s web-servers;

17

e.

The web-servers of the medical websites from which the Facebook acquired

18

the Plaintiffs’ communications;

19

f.

20

the Plaintiffs’ communications with the medical websites; and

21

g.

22
23

The computer code deployed by Facebook to effectuate its acquisition of

The plan Facebook carried out to effectuate the tracking and interception of
user communications while on medical websites.

262.

As illustrated above, “the” communications between the Plaintiffs and the medical

24 websites were simultaneous, but separate from, the channel through which Facebook acquired the
25 content of those communications.
26

263.

Facebook

intentionally

acquired

the

contents

of

Plaintiffs’

electronic

27 communications with every medical website specifically mentioned in this Complaint and
28 hundreds of others attached to personally-identifiable information through the process described
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1 above.
2

264.

Each website of a health care Defendant in this case has control of its own website:

3

a.

Defendant ACS controls Cancer.org;

4

b.

Defendant ASCO controls Cancer.net;

5

c.

Defendant MRF controls Melanoma.org;

6

d.

Defendant Adventist controls ShawneeMission.org and its other websites;

7

e.

Defendant BJC controls BarnesJewish.org;

8

f.

Defendant Cleveland Clinic controls ClevelandClinic.org; and

9

g.

Defendant MDAnderson controls MDAnderson.org.

10

265.

The health care Defendants each, respectively, placed code on their websites and

11 web-pages which facilitated the disclosure, tracking, interception, and acquisition of the Plaintiffs’
12 communications with the medical websites by Facebook through the process described in this
13 Complaint.
14

266.

The disclosure, tracking, interception, and acquisition of the Plaintiffs’ health-

15 related communications to and from the medical websites by Facebook was not authorized by the
16 Plaintiffs.
17

a.

18
19

The disclosure, tracking, and interception was done without their
knowledge;

b.

The disclosure, tracking, and interception was done without their express or

20

implied consent, despite the fact that sensitive medical information,

21

including communications, are protected by state and federal laws

22

(including HIPAA) which explicitly require affirmative, detailed written

23

consent before such information can be disclosed to or tracked by a third-

24

party;

25

c.

The disclosure, tracking, and interception was further done without their

26

express or implied consent and was, in fact, contrary to the privacy policies

27

of the medical websites with which they were sending and receiving

28

medical communications;
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1

d.

The disclosure, tracking, and interception was further done without their

2

express or implied consent because Facebook failed to provide users with

3

any notice that it tracked their communications on medical websites in

4

violation of those websites privacy policies and HIPAA, or that it tracked

5

communications with medical websites for purposes of placing its users into

6

categories for purposes of direct marketing to users with sensitive medical

7

conditions and interests;

8

e.

In addition to the facts set forth above, Facebook lacked the Plaintiffs’

9

express consent as a matter of law because they did not make any disclosure

10

that they tracked sensitive medical information. Nor did they obtain consent

11

for such disclosure consistent with HIPAA or California law regarding

12

medical privacy;

13

f.

In addition to the facts set forth above, Facebook lacked the Plaintiffs’

14

express and implied consent as a matter of law because medical privacy

15

enjoys greater protection than other general Internet privacy and the

16

Facebook and the health care Defendants failed to make any disclosures

17

related to the interception of medical communications; and

18

g.

In addition to the facts set forth above, Facebook lacked the Plaintiffs’

19

express and implied consent as a matter of law because Facebook’s tracking

20

on the health care Defendants’ websites violated the privacy policies of

21

those websites, all of which were either scanned or available to be scanned

22

by Facebook’s web-crawler and, accordingly, Facebook had either actual or

23

constructive knowledge that it was intercepting communications in

24

violation of those privacy policies.

25

267.

Facebook’s scheme involved the contemporaneous acquisition of the contents of

26 communications Plaintiffs were in the process of making to and receiving from the health care
27 Defendants. As detailed above, Facebook acquired the content of communications within
28 milliseconds of the Plaintiffs’ GET requests to the medical websites, in such a fashion that the
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1 Plaintiffs would have no reason to suspect Facebook acquired the communications, and before the
2 communications between the Plaintiffs and the respective medical websites had been completed.
3

268.

The interceptions included the “contents” of such electronic communications in the

4 form of detailed URLs requested, search queries, and ‘GET’ requests made by Plaintiffs.
5

269.

For the lead-Plaintiffs, these “contents” included the following communications

6 which contained information relating to the substance, purport, or meaning of the named
7 Plaintiffs’ communications:
8

a.

9

For Defendant ACS, the following contain information relating to the
“substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication:

10



Cancer – Treatment – Support Program Services – Index

11



Cancer – Finding and Paying for Treatment – Understanding Health

12

Insurance – Health Insurance and Financial Assistance for the

13

Cancer Patient—Health Insurance and Financial Assistance TOC


14

Cancer – Treatment – Finding and Paying for Treatment –

15

Understanding Health Insurance – Prescription Drug Assistance

16

Programs – Prescription Drug Assistance Programs – TOC


17
18
19

Lung Cancer – Small Cell – Detailed Guide – Small Cell Lung
Cancer After Lifestyle Changes

b.

For Defendant ASCO, the following contain information relating to the

20

“substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication:

21

i.

22

Cancer – Navigating Cancer Care – Financial Consideration –
Financial Resources

23

ii.

Cancer – Cancer Types – Melanoma – Treatment Options

24

iii.

Cancer – Navigating Cancer Care – Diagnosing Cancer – Tests and

25
26

Procedures – Positron Emission Tomography PET Scan
c.

For Defendant MRF, the following contain information relating to the

27

“substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication: Melanoma – Find

28

Support – Patient Community – MPIP Melanoma
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1

d.

2

For Defendant Adventist, the following contain information relating to the
“substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication:

3

i.

Shawnee Mission – Health Services – Center for Pain Medicine

4

ii.

Shawnee Mission – Orthopaedic Spine Center

5

iii.

Shawnee Mission – Find a Doctor – Scott E. Ashcraft MD

6

e.

7

For Defendant BJC, the following contain information relating to the
“substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication:

8

i.

Barnes Jewish – Physicians – Details Physician 1033041

9

ii.

Barnes Jewish – Physicians – Details Physician 1027051

10

f.

For Defendant Cleveland Clinic, the following contains information relating

11

to the “substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication: Cleveland

12

Clinic – Search – Results – Q – Intestine Transplant

13

g.

For Defendant MD Anderson, the following contains information relating to

14

the “substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication: MD Anderson –

15

Cancer Wise – Metastatic Melanoma – A Wife Reflects on Husbands

16

Shocking Diagnosis

17

270.

In addition to acquiring “content” of the plaintiffs’ communications to the health

18 care Defendants, Facebook also intercepted “content” of the communications Plaintiffs received in
19 return from the health care Defendants. For example, the GET request for the Cancer.org
20 webpage: http://www.cancer.org/cancer/testicularcancer/detailedguide/testicular-cancer-diagnosis,
21 returns a communication from Cancer.org with a nearly 2,000 word essay on how testicular cancer
22 is diagnosed. The following is a partial screenshot of the communication Cancer.org sent in
23 response to such a GET request. It includes approximately 1/16th of the total communication from
24 Cancer.org in response to the GET request:
25 / / /
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

271.

GET requests are electronic communications because they involves a “transfer of

13 signs, signals, writing, … data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
14 wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate …
15 commerce.”
16

272.

Every URL detailed in this Complaint was included with a GET request.

17

273.

The Plaintiffs’ particular GET requests were communications.

18

274.

Web-server and website responses to GET requests are communications.

19

275.

The health care Defendants’ responses to Plaintiffs’ GET requests in this case were

20 communications.
21

276.

A substantially similar or identical process was carried out for communications sent

22 to and received from the other Defendants’ medical websites.
23

277.

The consent of a party to a communication is an affirmative defense under the

24 Wiretap Act which must be plead and proven by a defendant claiming the exception.
25

278.

Though each health care Defendant intentionally placed or allowed to be placed

26 computer code on their websites which permitted Facebook to acquire the Plaintiffs’ health-related
27 Internet communications in violation of each health care Defendants’ privacy policy, Plaintiffs are
28 without knowledge whether Facebook’s interceptions were indeed carried out with the knowledge
65

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 5:16-cv-01282 Document 1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 70 of 92

1 and consent of the health care Defendants.
2

279.

Plaintiffs are without knowledge of the absence or existence of private

3 communications or agreements between Facebook and each health care Defendant which may
4 evince the express consent to such tracking by the health care Defendants.
5

280.

Facebook’s public notice to potential developers and website owners is deficient

6 with respect to its plan to track the personally-identifiable information of Facebook users and
7 intercept communications to and from websites which place Facebook code on their webpages.
8

281.

Facebook’s page explaining its “Like Button for the Web” to Developers does not

9 disclose that installing a Like button on a webpage permits Facebook to track communications of
10 its individually-identifiable users with the webpage installing the Like button whether or not the
11 user actually clicks on the Like button.30 See Exhibit D for Facebook Developer Pages.
12

282.

Facebook’s “Social Plugins FAQs” page for developers does not disclose that

13 installing a Like button permits Facebook to track communications of its individually-identifiable
14 users whether the user clicks on the Like button or not.31
15

283.

To plaintiffs’ knowledge, Facebook does not disclose its tracking or interception of

16 communications via the Like button anywhere on its Developer platform.
17

284.

To plaintiffs’ knowledge, Facebook does not disclose its tracking or interception of

18 communications via the Share button or other graphics on its Developer platform.
19

285.

Facebook has actual or constructive knowledge of the content of the Privacy Policy

20 of each webpage which includes social plug-ins or links to Facebook.
21

286.

In its “Social Plugins FAQs,” Facebook informs that it “scrape[s]” developer

22 “page[s] every 30 days.”32
23

287.

Facebook’s web-crawler scrapes the Privacy Policies of websites hosting social

24 plug-ins.
25

288.

The privacy policies of the health care Defendants explicitly promise not to

26
27

30

See https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/like-button.
See https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/faqs.
28 32 See https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/faqs/#scraperinfo.
31
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1 disclose personally-identifiable information to third-parties like Facebook.
2

289.

Despite Facebook’s constructive and actual knowledge of the health care

3 Defendants’ privacy policies, they continued to track and intercept user communications with
4 those websites in violation of the medical website privacy policies.
5

290.

Facebook’s constructive and actual knowledge that their respective interceptions

6 were violating the privacy policies of the health care Defendants put it on notice that those medical
7 websites neither knew nor consented to Facebook’s tracking and interceptions of communications
8 on those websites.
9

291.

In the event discovery reveals any particular health care Defendant lacked

10 knowledge or did not consent to the tracking and interceptions of health-related Internet
11 communications, Facebook is liable both to the particular Plaintiff subclass and the non12 consenting health care Defendant.
13

292.

Upon information and belief, the health care Defendants lack financial or any other

14 significant incentive to violate their own privacy policies and flout HIPAA for any benefit gained
15 by placing Facebook’s computer code on their respective medical web-pages. Discovery is
16 necessary to determine the extent of their knowledge of and consent (or lack thereof) to Defendant
17 Facebook’s tracking and interceptions.
18

293.

In the event discovery reveals any particular health care Defendant did consent to

19 interceptions by Facebook, Plaintiffs hereby allege the interception was accomplished through a
20 scheme by which each consenting Defendant and Facebook committed criminal and tortious acts
21 in violation of the laws of the United States and all 50 states. In particular, Defendants’ scheme:
22

a.

Violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and corresponding computer

23

crime laws in all 50 states because Defendants knowingly placed or

24

facilitated the placement of onto Plaintiffs’ computing devices third-party

25

cookies which tracked Plaintiffs’ personally-identifiable and sensitive

26

medical information without their consent, thereby intentionally exceeding

27

authorized access to and obtaining information from the Plaintiffs’

28

computers. Intentionally exceeding authorization and obtaining information
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1

from a computer used in interstate commerce violates the Computer Fraud

2

and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), and corresponding computer

3

crime laws of all 50 states;

4

b.

Constituted a tortious intrusion upon seclusion as alleged herein;

5

c.

Violated the criminal provisions of the California Invasion of Privacy Act

6

as alleged herein;

7

d.

Involved criminal and civil violations of HIPAA;

8

e.

Constituted negligence per se;

9

f.

Constituted the negligent disclosure of confidential information; and

10

g.

Constituted a breach of fiduciary duties of confidentiality.

11

294.

As a result of the above violations and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520, the Court may

12 assess statutory damages to Plaintiffs and the Class in the sum of the greater of $100 for each day
13 each Class Member’s electronic communications were intercepted, disclosed, or used, or $10,000
14 per violation, whichever is greater; injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages in an
15 amount to be determined by a jury, but sufficient to prevent the same or similar conduct by
16 Defendants in the future, and a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably
17 incurred.
18

COUNT II – INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION

19

(Against All Defendants)

20

295.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

21

296.

In carrying out the scheme to disclose, divulge, track, and intercept the Plaintiffs’

22 personal information combined with medical information and communications without the
23 consent of the Plaintiffs, Defendants intentionally intruded upon the Plaintiffs’ solitude or
24 seclusion in that they disclosed and tracked highly-confidential, personally-identifiable medical
25 information and communications from the privacy of the Plaintiffs’ homes and computing devices.
26

297.

The Plaintiffs’ medical communications constitute private conversations and

27 matters.
28

298.

The Plaintiffs’ medical communications with the health care Defendants were
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1 promised to be kept private by the privacy policies of the health care Defendants.
2

299.

By law, the Plaintiffs’ medical communications with covered entities under HIPAA

3 must remain private unless the Plaintiffs provide their express written consent to a disclosure on a
4 form consistent with the requirements of HIPAA.
5

300.

6

The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of and did not expressly or impliedly consent to:
a.

7

The health care Defendants’ disclosures of their medical communications to
Facebook;

8

b.

9

Facebook’s acquisition of their communications with the health care
Defendants; or

10

c.

Facebook’s taking of their personal information and medical information

11

for purposes of direct marketing by placing them into medical categories for

12

sale to advertisers.

13

301.

Defendants’ intentional intrusion on the Plaintiffs’ solitude or seclusion is highly

14 offensive to a reasonable person in that they violated federal and state criminal and civil statutes
15 designed to protect individual privacy. Specifically, Defendants’ conduct violated:
16

a.

The Wiretap Act as alleged herein;

17

b.

The Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §3121, which prohibits the non-consensual

18

installation or use of a pen register or trap and trace device. A “pen register”

19

is “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,

20

addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility

21

from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,

22

however, that such information shall not include the contents of any

23

communication.” The cookies at issue in this case intercept both “content”

24

and “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling” information and therefore

25

fall under the Pen Register Act. A “trap and trace device” is “a device or

26

process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which

27

identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and

28

signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
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1

electronic communication.” The cookies at issue in this case also work as

2

“trap and trace” devices because, in addition to capturing content, they also

3

capture impulses identifying the originating number and other dialing,

4

routing, addressing, and signaling information. These pen registers and trap-

5

and-trace devices were installed and used by Facebook and the health care

6

Defendants without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent;

7

c.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and corresponding computer crime

8

laws in all 50 states because Defendants’ knowingly placed or facilitated the

9

placement of third-party cookies on the computing devices of the Plaintiffs’

10

which tracked personally-identifiable information without the Plaintiffs’

11

consent, thereby intentionally exceeding authorized access to the Plaintiffs’

12

computers and obtaining information from their computers. Intentional

13

access to a computer which exceeds authorization and results in the

14

obtaining of information from a computer used in interstate commerce

15

violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C),

16

and corresponding computer crime laws of all 50 states;

17

d.

The California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code § 631;

18

e.

HIPAA; and

19

f.

For Facebook, violated California Civ. Code §1798.91, which provides that

20

“[a] business may not request in writing medical information directly from

21

an individual regardless of whether the information pertains to the

22

individual or not, and use, share or otherwise disclose that information for

23

direct marketing purposes” unless it first “disclose[s] in a clear and

24

conspicuous manner that it is obtaining the information to market or

25

advertise products, goods, or services to the individual” and “obtain[s] the

26

written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains … to

27

permit his or her medical information to be used or shared to market or

28

advertise products, goods, or services to the individual.”
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1

302.

In addition to engaging in activity which comprises a criminal offense under

2 federal law and all 50 states, the unauthorized disclosure and tracking of the Plaintiffs’ highly3 confidential and personally-identifiable cancer and other medical-related communications and
4 information is, in and of itself, highly offensive to reasonable people.
5

303.

Defendants’ unauthorized disclosures and tracking were perpetrated on millions of

6 unsuspecting Americans, which is also highly offensive to a reasonable persons.
7

304.

Plaintiffs sustained economic damage through Defendants’ intrusion upon their

8 seclusion by way of economic loss associated with the medical information taken without their
9 consent and general damages for the Defendants’ invasion into the Plaintiffs’ zone of privacy for
10 which damages are available without proof of pecuniary loss or physical harm. Under the common
11 law tort of intrusion upon seclusion, general damages are presumed: a monetary award calculated
12 without reference to specific harm, but to be calculated by a jury. Plaintiffs also seek
13 compensation for any revenues or other benefits the Defendants derived from the invasion of
14 Plaintiffs’ right to privacy. Finally, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages in this claim in an amount to
15 be determined by a jury.
16

COUNT III – CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT

17

(Against All Defendants)

18

305.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

19

306.

Defendant Facebook:

20

a.

Is headquartered in California;

21

b.

Directs its Internet tracking activities from California;

22

c.

Receives tracked Internet communications in California;

23

d.

Includes a binding Terms of Use adopting California law to govern all

24

disputes with their members; and

25

e.

Upon information and belief, requires developers to agree to its Terms of

26

Use adopting California law to govern disputes with developers and

27

websites utilizing Facebook code.

28

307.

Plaintiffs are without knowledge as to whether the health care Defendants had
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1 knowledge of and consented to Facebook’s acquisition of the contents of Internet communications
2 made between the Plaintiffs and the health care Defendants. In the event that any health care
3 Defendant had knowledge and consented, it subjected itself to California law by knowingly
4 disclosing Plaintiffs’ communications to Facebook, which is headquartered in, operates out of, and
5 adopts California law to govern disputes involving their business practices.
6

308.

California Penal Code § 631(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who … willfully and without the consent of all parties to the
communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts to read,
or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or
communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or
cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state; or
who uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to
communicate in any way, any information so obtained, or who aids, agrees
with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to lawfully do, or
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this
section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred
dollars.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
309.

In addition, California Penal Code § 632 provides, in pertinent part:

14
Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a
confidential communication, by means of any … recording device, ...
records the confidential communication … shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding [$2,500].

15
16
17

310.

California Penal Code § 637.2 creates a civil cause of action for any person whose

18 rights have been violated under § 631 or 632 and provides for statutory damages for the greater of
19 $5,000 or three times the amount of actual damages, as well as injunctive relief.
20

311.

The California Invasion of Privacy Act in § 631(a) has been interpreted to be

21 identical to its federal Wiretap counterpart with one key difference – to avoid liability under CIPA,
22 an interceptor must obtain “the consent of all parties to the communication.”
23

312.

Plaintiffs’ communications with the health care Defendants are communications

24 covered by §631(a).
25

313.

Plaintiffs’ communications with the health care Defendants are confidential

26 because they were carried on in circumstances reasonably indicating to the Plaintiffs that they
27 would be confined to the parties thereto.
28

314.

Plaintiffs’ communications with the health care Defendants included “content” as
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1 defined under § 631(a) and the federal Wiretap Act in that GET requests, search queries, and full2 string URLs containing file paths include information “relating to the substance, purport, or
3 meaning” of communications.
4

315.

Defendants’

disclosures,

interceptions,

acquisitions

and

tracking

were

5 accomplished while Plaintiffs’ communications were in transit, being sent from, or being received
6 at places in California.
7

316.

Defendants’ disclosures, interceptions, acquisitions, and tracking were done

8 without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent and in direct contravention of the Defendants’
9 Privacy Policies and federal and state laws on medical privacy.
10

317.

Plaintiffs are without knowledge of whether the health care Defendants gave either

11 their express or implied consent for Facebook to intercept medical communications the health care
12 Defendants sent to and received from the Plaintiffs. Upon information and belief, the health care
13 Defendants lacked sufficient incentives to reasonably conclude in the absence of discovery that
14 they expressly or impliedly consented to Facebook’s conduct. To Plaintiffs’ knowledge, Facebook
15 did not publicly disclose on its developer pages that its code would result in Facebook’s tracking
16 of communications between the owners of the webpages on which the code was placed and
17 Internet users. Further, Facebook had actual and constructive knowledge of the health care
18 Defendants’ privacy policies and their status as “covered entities” under HIPAA through their
19 website names and the fact that their web-pages were either scraped or available to be scraped by
20 Facebook’s web-crawlers. Discovery is necessary to determine if there exist any private
21 communications between Facebook and the health care Defendants relating to consent. However,
22 to the extent no communications between Facebook and the health care Defendants are produced
23 showing either express or implied consent, the health care Defendants each have their own cause24 of-action under CIPA and the federal Wiretap Act against Facebook.
25

318.

Defendants additionally used and communicated such information to their benefit

26 and to the detriment of Plaintiffs.
27

319.

To the extent the health care Defendants were aware of and consented to

28 Facebook’s acquisition of the contents of the Plaintiffs’ communications with the health care
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1 Defendants, they are liable under §631(a) for “aid[ing], agree[ing] with, employ[ing], or
2 conspir[ing] with” Facebook to “unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done” actions in violation
3 of § 631(a).
4

320.

Facebook is not a party to the communications between the Plaintiffs and the health

5 care Defendants. However, in the alternative, if the Court deems Facebook to be a party to the
6 communications as a matter of law, Facebook remains liable under Cal. Pen. Code § 632(a).
7

321.

Pursuant to §637.2, persons whose rights are violated under the California Invasion

8 of Privacy Act “may bring an action against the person who committed the violation for the
9 greater of … “$5,000” or “[t]hree times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the
10 plaintiff.” The California Act is clear that it “is not a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant
11 to this section that the Plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages.”
12

COUNT IV – CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL INVASION OF PRIVACY

13

(Against All Defendants)

14

322.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

15

323.

Art. I, sec. 1 of the California constitution declares that “[a]ll people are by nature

16 free and independent and have inalienable rights[]” which include the right to “privacy.”
17

324.

Art. I, sec. 1 of the California constitution creates a right of action against private

18 as well as government entities that violate privacy rights in California where the plaintiffs have a
19 legally protected privacy interest, a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the defendant’s action
20 constitutes a serious invasion of privacy.
21

325.

Plaintiffs have several specific legally protected privacy interests in their sensitive,

22 health-related Internet communications with the health care Defendants. These rights include:
23

a.

The Wiretap Act as alleged herein;

24

b.

The Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §3121, which prohibits the non-consensual

25

installation or use of a pen register or trap and trace device. A “pen register”

26

is “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,

27

addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility

28

from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,
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1

however, that such information shall not include the contents of any

2

communication.” The cookies at issue in this case intercept both “content”

3

and “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling” information and therefore

4

fall under the Pen Register Act. A “trap and trace device” is “a device or

5

process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which

6

identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and

7

signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or

8

electronic communication.” The cookies at issue in this case also work as

9

“trap and trace” devices because, in addition to capturing content, they also

10

capture impulses identifying the originating number and other dialing,

11

routing, addressing, and signaling information. These pen registers and trap-

12

and-trace devices were installed and used by Facebook and the health care

13

Defendants without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent;

14

c.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and corresponding computer crime

15

laws in all 50 states because Defendants’ knowingly placed or facilitated the

16

placement of third-party cookies on the computing devices of the Plaintiffs

17

which tracked personally-identifiable information without the Plaintiffs’

18

consent, thereby intentionally exceeding authorized access to the Plaintiffs’

19

computers and obtaining information from their computers. Intentional

20

access to a computer which exceeds authorization and results in the

21

obtaining of information from a computer used in interstate commerce

22

violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C),

23

and corresponding computer crime laws of all 50 states;

24

d.

The California Invasion of Privacy Act;

25

e.

HIPAA;

26

f.

California Civ. Code §1798.91, which prohibits non-healthcare providers

27

using, sharing, or otherwise disclosing individually identifiable information

28

about a person’s medical history, treatment, or diagnosis for purposes of
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1

direct-marketing unless it (1) discloses in a clear and conspicuous manner it

2

is obtaining the information to market or advertise products, good, and

3

services, and (2) obtains written consent to permit their medical information

4

to be used or shared to market or advertise products, goods, or services to

5

the individual; and

6
7

g.
326.

The privacy policies of the health care Defendants in this case.

Plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation of privacy that Facebook would not acquire

8 and the health care Defendants would not disclose their medical communications with the
9 healthcare Defendants’ websites and other websites of health care providers in that:
10

a.

Facebook’s acquisitions violate the Privacy Policies of those websites;

11

b.

Facebook fails to disclose that it tracks, intercepts, and acquires user

12

communications in violation of other websites’ privacy policies;

13

c.

Facebook fails to disclose that it tracks, intercepts, and acquires

14

communications on healthcare websites and the websites of healthcare

15

providers;

16

d.

Facebook fails to disclose its direct marketing activities pursuant to the

17

requirements of Cal. Civ. Code §1798.91, yet maintains direct marketing

18

lists of 255 million Facebook users in the United States grouped by

19

sensitive medical categories and sells direct marketing access to those lists

20

to advertisers; and

21

e.

The actions of the health care Defendants and Facebook violate the federal

22

and state criminal and civil laws set forth above, and it is reasonable for

23

Plaintiffs to expect that health care Defendants and Facebook would not

24

commit illegal acts against them.

25

327.

Defendants’ invasions of Plaintiffs’ privacy interests constitute a serious invasion

26 of privacy in that health-related communications and records are among the types of information
27 Americans hold most secret and are, accordingly, protected by state and federal law.
28

328.

Defendants’ invasions of Plaintiffs’ privacy interests constitute an egregious breach
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1 of social norms.
2

329.

Facebook lacks a legitimate business interest in tracking, intercepting, and

3 acquiring sensitive medical communications. Any interest Facebook has in tracking, intercepting,
4 and acquiring sensitive medical communications is outweighed by the Plaintiffs’ rights to privacy,
5 as evidence by social norms and the federal and state criminal and civil statutes set forth above.
6

330.

The health care Defendants lack legitimate business interests in disclosing sensitive

7 medical communications to Facebook. Any interest the health care Defendants have in those
8 disclosures is outweighed by the Plaintiffs’ rights to privacy, as evidenced by social norms and the
9 federal and state criminal and civil statutes set forth above.
10

331.

Plaintiffs and the class members sustained damage through Defendants’ invasion of

11 their constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution by way of economic loss
12 associated with the medical information taken without their consent and general damages for the
13 Defendants’ invasion into the Plaintiffs’ zone of privacy for which damages are available without
14 proof of pecuniary loss or physical harm. Under the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion,
15 general damages are presumed: a monetary award calculated without reference to specific harm,
16 but to be calculated by a jury. Plaintiffs seek compensation for any revenues or other benefits the
17 medical website and/or Tracker Defendants derived from the invasion of Plaintiffs’ constitutional
18 rights. Finally, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages in this claim in an amount to be determined by a
19 jury.
20

COUNT V – NEGLIGENCE PER SE

21

(Against All Defendants)

22

332.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

23

333.

Defendants’ conduct violated several criminal and civil laws of the United States

24 and individual states, including:
25

a.

The Wiretap Act as alleged herein;

26

b.

The Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §3121, which prohibits the non-consensual

27

installation or use of a pen register or trap and trace device. A “pen register”

28

is “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
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1

addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility

2

from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,

3

however, that such information shall not include the contents of any

4

communication.” The cookies at issue in this case intercept both “content”

5

and “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling” information and therefore

6

fall under the Pen Register Act. A “trap and trace device” is “a device or

7

process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which

8

identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and

9

signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or

10

electronic communication.” The cookies at issue in this case also work as

11

“trap and trace” devices because, in addition to capturing content, they also

12

capture impulses identifying the originating number and other dialing,

13

routing, addressing, and signaling information. These pen registers and trap-

14

and-trace devices were installed and used by Facebook and the health care

15

Defendants without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent;

16

c.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and corresponding computer crime

17

laws in all 50 states because Defendants’ knowingly placed or facilitated the

18

placement of third-party cookies on the computing devices of the Plaintiffs’

19

which tracked personally-identifiable information without the Plaintiffs’

20

consent, thereby intentionally exceeding authorized access to the Plaintiffs’

21

computers and obtaining information from their computers. Intentional

22

access to a computer which exceeds authorization and results in the

23

obtaining of information from a computer used in interstate commerce

24

violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C),

25

and corresponding computer crime laws of all 50 states;

26

d.

The California Invasion of Privacy Act;

27

e.

HIPAA; and

28

f.

For Facebook, violated California Civ. Code §1798.91, which prohibits
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1

non-healthcare

2

individually identifiable information about a person’s medical history,

3

treatment, or diagnosis for purposes of direct-marketing unless it (1)

4

discloses in a clear and conspicuous manner it is obtaining the information

5

to market or advertise products, good, and services, and (2) obtains written

6

consent to permit their medical information to be used or shared to market

7

or advertise products, goods, or services to the individual.

8

334.

providers

using,

sharing,

or

otherwise

disclosing

The Wiretap Act, Pen Register Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and its

9 corresponding 50 state analog statutes, impose criminal penalties on violators.
10

335.

These statutes and rules are designed to protect the Internet privacy and medical

11 privacy of American citizens.
12

336.

The Plaintiffs are members of the protected classes of the above-cited statutes.

13

337.

As a result of Defendants’ violations of these statutes, Plaintiffs and the class

14 members were harmed by having their sensitive medical-information disclosed, tracked, and
15 intercepted without their knowledge or consent. In addition, they were harmed by violation of Cal.
16 Civ. Code §1798.91 through Facebook’s use of their personally-identifiable medical information
17 for direct marketing purposes after the information was collected directly from Plaintiffs without
18 the consent required by law.
19

COUNT VI – NEGLIGENT DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

20

(Against All Health Care Defendants)

21

338.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

22

339.

The health care Defendants had a duty to keep Plaintiffs’ medical communications

23 on the Internet with them confidential. This duty arises from:
24

a.

25
26

For the Defendants that are “covered entities” under HIPAA, from their
status as health-care providers and federal law;

b.

For all health care Defendants, from their privacy policies promising users

27

that they would not share or disclose their users’ medical communications

28

to third-parties.
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1

340.

By designing their websites in a fashion that facilitated the disclosure to, tracking,

2 and interception of Plaintiffs’ medical communications by Facebook, the health care Defendants
3 breached their duty of confidentiality.
4

341.

The health care Defendants’ website designs caused Plaintiffs’ confidential medical

5 communications to be divulged to Facebook without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent.
6

342.

As a result of the above-pleaded facts, Plaintiffs and the class members suffered

7 damage in that what the Plaintiffs intended to remain private is no longer so, their personally8 identifiable confidential medical communications and records were disclosed to, tracked, and
9 intercepted by Facebook without their consent.
10

COUNT VII – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY

11

(Against All Health Care Defendants)

12

343.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

13

344.

The health care Defendants that are covered entities under HIPAA have a fiduciary

14 duty to maintain the confidentiality of medical communications.
15

345.

All of the health care Defendants created a fiduciary duty through their privacy

16 policies to maintain the confidentiality of medical communications and records from users of their
17 websites.
18

346.

The health care Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of confidentiality to the

19 plaintiff classes by designing their websites such that the websites disclosed to and permitted
20 Facebook to track the Plaintiffs’ confidential medical communications and records.
21

347.

As a result of the above-pleaded facts, Plaintiffs and the class members suffered

22 damage in that what the Plaintiffs intended to remain private is no longer so, their personally23 identifiable confidential medical communications and records were disclosed to, tracked, and
24 intercepted by Facebook without their consent.
25

COUNT VIII – BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

26

(Against Facebook)

27

348.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

28

349.

Defendant Facebook:
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1

a.

Is headquartered in California;

2

b.

Directs Internet tracking activities from California;

3

c.

Receives tracked Internet communications in California; and

4

d.

Includes a Terms of Use adopting California law to govern all disputes with

5
6

their members.
350.

Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its

7 performance and enforcement.
8

351.

Defendant Facebook and its users enter into a binding contract upon the user

9 signing-up for the service by clicking on the “Signup” button located directly below a sentence
10 informing the user, “By clicking Sign Up, you agree to our Terms and that you have read our Data
11 Policy, including our Cookie Use.”
12
13
14
15
16
17

352.

Facebook users pay for Facebook’s services with their personal information.

18 Facebook’s users exchange something of value – access to their personal information – for
19 Facebook’s services and Facebook’s promise to safeguard that personal information and to act in a
20 manner that is reasonable, consistent with the spirit of the bargain made, and does not abuse
21 Facebook’s power to specify the terms of the contract.
22

353.

In dealings between Facebook and its users, Facebook is invested with

23 discretionary power affecting the rights of its users.
24

354.

Facebook purports to respect and protect its users’ privacy. Facebook’s “Terms”

25 document claims:
26
27
28

Your privacy is very important to us. We designed our Data Policy to
make important disclosures about how you can use Facebook to share with
others and how we collect and can use your content and information. We
encourage you to read the Data Policy, and to use it to help you make
informed decisions.
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1

355.

Despite Facebook’s pledge to “make important disclosures” to users so they can

2 “make informed decisions,” Facebook’s Data Policy fails to inform users that it:
3

a.

4

Tracks users and intercepts their communications with websites in violation
of those websites’ privacy policies;

5

b.

Tracks users and intercepts their communications with healthcare-related

6

websites, including the websites of medical providers subject to HIPAA;

7

and

8

c.

9

purposes of placing users into medical categories for direct marketing

10
11

Takes and records users’ medical communications and information for

purposes in violation of Cal. Civ. Code §1798.91.
356.

Facebook’s conduct in tracking users and intercepting their communications with

12 websites in violation of those websites’ privacy policies is objectively unreasonable.
13

357.

Facebook’s conduct in tracking users and intercepting their communications with

14 healthcare-related websites, including the websites of medical providers is objectively
15 unreasonable.
16

358.

Facebook’s conduct in taking users’ medical communications and information for

17 purposes of placing them into medical categories for direct marketing purposes is objectively
18 unreasonable as a matter of law because it is illegal under California law unless notice of the
19 practice is provided in a clear-and-conspicuous manner and written consent is obtained from the
20 person to whom the information is taken for direct marketing purposes.
21

359.

Facebook’s

conduct

in

tracking

and

intercepting

Plaintiffs’

medical

22 communications at issue in this case evades the spirit of the bargain made between Facebook and
23 the plaintiffs.
24

360.

Facebook’s conduct in directly tracking and recording Plaintiffs’ medical

25 information to further Facebook’s direct marketing purposes evades the spirit of the bargain made
26 between Facebook and the Plaintiffs.
27

361.

Facebook’s conduct at issue in this case abuses its power to specify terms – in

28 particular, Facebook’s vague disclosures of its tracking which fail to disclose that it tracks and
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1 intercepts communications in violation of other websites’ privacy policies and tracks and
2 intercepts communications with health-care related websites, including medical providers.
3

362.

As a result of Facebook’s conduct which is objectively unreasonable, evades the

4 spirit of the bargain made between Facebook and its users, and abuses Facebook’s power to
5 specify terms in the contract it has with its users, Plaintiffs and the class members did not receive
6 the benefit of the bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration
7 in the form of their personal information which has ascertainable value to be proven at trial.
8 Plaintiffs’ actual and appreciable damages take the form of the value of their PII that Facebook
9 wrongfully tracked and intercepted from their communications with health care websites and the
10 medical information Facebook wrongfully used to place its users into medical categories for direct
11 marketing purposes. In addition to these damages, Plaintiffs also seek nominal damages based on
12 Facebook’s breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and disgorgement from Facebook of
13 all the proceeds that it wrongfully obtained by breaching said duty.
14

COUNT IX – VIOLATION OF CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1572 & 1573

15

(Against Facebook)

16

363.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

17

364.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1572 provides in relevant part that actual fraud exists when a

18 party to a contract suppresses “that which is true, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact”
19 “with the intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce him to enter into the contract.” In
20 addition, it provides that actual fraud exists where there is “any other act fitted to deceive.”
21

365.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1573 provides in relevant part that constructive fraud exists “in

22 any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent, without respect to actual
23 fraud.”
24

366.

Facebook violated § 1572, actual fraud, through its suppression, with the intent to

25 deceive its users, of the facts that it (a) tracks and intercepts user communications in violation of
26 other websites’ privacy policies, (b) tracks and intercepts user communications with health-care
27 related websites, including the websites of medical providers subject to HIPAA; and (c) tracks,
28 takes, and records users’ medical communications and information for purposes of placing users
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1 into medical categories for direct marketing purposes. Plaintiffs relied on Facebook’s false
2 assertions in contracting with and using Facebook.
3

367.

Additionally, Facebook violated § 1573, constructive fraud, by breaching its duty

4 of good faith and fair dealing as alleged above and violating all of the assorted federal and state
5 criminal and civil statutes alleged in this Complaint.
6

368.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, seek damages from Facebook,

7 including but not limited to disgorgement of all proceeds Facebook obtained from its unlawful
8 business practices.
9

COUNT X – QUANTUM MERUIT

10

(Against Facebook)

11

369.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

12

370.

Facebook obtained a benefit from (a) tracking and intercepting user

13 communications in violation of other websites’ privacy policies, (b) tracking and intercepting user
14 communications with health-care related websites, including the websites of medical providers
15 subject to HIPAA; and (c), for Facebook, tracking, taking, and recording users’ medical
16 communications and information for purposes of placing users into medical categories for direct
17 marketing purposes.
18

371.

Facebook may not justly retain the benefit it accrued from (a) tracking and

19 intercepting user communications in violation of other websites’ privacy policies, (b) tracking and
20 intercepting user communications with health-care related websites, including the websites of
21 medical providers subject to HIPAA; and (c) tracking, taking, and recording users’ medical
22 communications and information for purposes of placing users into medical categories for direct
23 marketing purposes.
24

372.

Plaintiffs and the class members are entitled to restoration of their former position

25 through compensation for the value of the sensitive personally-identifiable health-related
26 information tracked and intercepted by Facebook without their knowledge or consent, and for
27 disgorgement from Facebook of any proceeds that Facebook wrongfully obtained through its
28 conduct.
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1 VII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

3

1.

Certify this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of

4 Civil Procedure and appoint Plaintiffs as the representatives of the Class and their counsel as Class
5 Counsel;
6

2.

Award compensatory damages, including statutory damages where available, to

7 Plaintiffs and the Class against Defendants for all damages sustained as a result of Defendants’
8 wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;
9

3.

Award restitution to Plaintiffs and the Class against Defendants;

10

4.

Award punitive damages in an amount that will deter Defendants and others from

11 like conduct;
12

5.

Permanently restrain Defendants, and their officers, agents, servants, employees,

13 and attorneys, from disclosing, tracking, and intercepting the health-related Internet
14 communications of Facebook users without consent or otherwise violating their policies with
15 users;
16

6.

Award Plaintiffs and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this

17 action, including counsel fees and expert fees;
18

7.

Order that Defendants delete the data they collected about users through the

19 unlawful means described above; and
20

8.

Grant Plaintiffs such further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

21 DATED: March 15, 2016

KIESEL LAW LLP

22
23
24
25

By:

/s/ Jeffrey A. Koncius
Paul R. Kiesel
Jeffrey A. Koncius
Nicole Ramirez

26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

THE GORNY LAW FIRM, LC
Stephen M. Gorny [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
steve@gornylawfirm.com
Chris Dandurand [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
chris@gornylawfirm.com
2 Emanuel Cleaver II Boulevard, Suite 410
Kansas City, MO 64112
Tel.: 816-756-5056
Fax: 816-756-5067
BARNES & ASSOCIATES
Jay Barnes [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
jaybarnes5@zoho.com
Rod Chapel [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
rod.chapel@gmail.com
219 East Dunklin Street, Suite A
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Tel.: 573-634-8884
Fax: 573-635-6291
EICHEN CRUTCHLOW ZASLOW & McELROY
Barry. R. Eichen [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
beichen@njadvocates.com
Evan J. Rosenberg [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
erosenberg@njadvocates.com
40 Ethel Road
Edison, NJ 08817
Tel.: 732-777-0100
Fax: 732-248-8273

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C.
Amy Gunn [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
agunn@simonlawpc.com
800 Market St., Ste. 1700
St. Louis, MO 63101
Tel.: 314-241-2929
Fax: 314-241-2029
BERGMANIS LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
Andrew Lyskowski [to be admitted Pro Hac
Vice]
alyskowski@ozarklawcenter.com
380 W. Hwy. 54, Ste. 201
Camdenton, MO 65020
Tel.: 573-346-2111
Fax: 573-346-5885

28
86

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 5:16-cv-01282 Document 1 Filed 03/15/16 Page 91 of 92

1 VIII. TRIAL BY JURY
2

Pursuant to the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America,

3 Plaintiffs are entitled to, and demand, a trial by jury.
4 DATED: March 15, 2016

KIESEL LAW LLP

5
6
7
8

By:

/s/ Jeffrey A. Koncius
Paul R. Kiesel
Jeffrey A. Koncius
Nicole Ramirez

9
10
11
12
13
14

THE GORNY LAW FIRM, LC
Stephen M. Gorny [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
steve@gornylawfirm.com
Chris Dandurand [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
chris@gornylawfirm.com
2 Emanuel Cleaver II Boulevard, Suite 410
Kansas City, MO 64112
Tel.: 816-756-5056
Fax: 816-756-5067

15
16
17
18
19
20

BARNES & ASSOCIATES
Jay Barnes [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
jaybarnes5@zoho.com
Rod Chapel [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
rod.chapel@gmail.com
219 East Dunklin Street, Suite A
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Tel.: 573-634-8884
Fax: 573-635-6291

21
22
23
24
25
26

EICHEN CRUTCHLOW ZASLOW & McELROY
Barry. R. Eichen [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
beichen@njadvocates.com
Evan J. Rosenberg [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
erosenberg@njadvocates.com
40 Ethel Road
Edison, NJ 08817
Tel.: 732-777-0100
Fax: 732-248-8273

27
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1
2
3
4

THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C.
Amy Gunn [to be admitted Pro Hac Vice]
agunn@simonlawpc.com
800 Market St., Ste. 1700
St. Louis, MO 63101
Tel.: 314-241-2929
Fax: 314-241-2029

5
6
7
8
9

BERGMANIS LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
Andrew Lyskowski [to be admitted Pro Hac
Vice]
alyskowski@ozarklawcenter.com
380 W. Hwy. 54, Ste. 201
Camdenton, MO 65020
Tel.: 573-346-2111
Fax: 573-346-5885
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